

# Covid-19, Human Displacement, and Expanding Crises of Insecurity in Africa: The case of Almajiri Children in Nigeria

Samuel Chukwudi Agunyai\* and Victor Ojakorotu

*Department of Political Studies and International Relations, North-West University, Mafikeng, South Africa*

**Abstract:** Governance failures, inadequate policy efforts, poverty, unemployment, insurgency, climate change, socio-economic downturns, religious fanatics or bandits, and other related factors have all been blamed for insecurity in Africa. This has left some holes in assessing Africa's present catastrophic insecurity situation via the prism of Covid-19 and human displacement. The research fills the gaps by presenting a fresh understanding of how Covid-19 and the illogical displacement of Almajiri children play a role in Nigeria's recent rise in instability. It makes considerable use of secondary sources and reviews empirical works on the issue. The results demonstrated that the Covid-19 shutdown sparked more banditry. Almajiri children were exposed to rebels and bandits who used them to carry out dangerous attacks on the Nigerian state. The breakout of Covid-19, according to results, partly contributed to the increase in insecurity in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Covid-19, Crisis, Expanding, Insecurity, Mobility.

## INTRODUCTION

Africa is supposed to be safe and secure to attract foreign direct investment, considering its wealth of resources and population which serves as a good market and labor to prospective investors. Its wealth of resources in terms of humans and minerals, if properly harnessed, can make it one of the powerful and socio-economically stable continents. However, the current situation contradicts the above picture. Africa looks very insecure due to conflicts, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and other security threats, which seem to scare Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and developed nations from channeling their strategic foreign policy interest in Africa. For most developed countries, security is paramount in their investment decisions; they rarely invest in countries where lives and properties are not safe (Ayoola, 2018). The relocation of some companies, investments, and humanitarian organizations from North-East Nigeria, where the onslaught of Boko-Haram is prevalent, some leaders confirms the ravaging effect of insecurity in Nigeria. Africa will have been more developed and progressive if it is safe and free of recurring activities of religious fundamentalists, the proliferation of small and light guns, bandits, insurgency, and armed robbery. This is not to say that insecurity is only peculiar to Africa, but its dimension in Africa seems to be out of the control of leaders in the continent (Moti, 2019; Akubor & Okolo, 2019).

Measures have been put into place to correct this ugly circumstance. For instance, countries (such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun, and Niger) that are ravaged

by Boko-Haram insurgents and other fundamentalists' activities have adopted a multipronged approach, such as dialogue (Ayoola, 2018) counter-terrorism, (Kah, 2017), formation of special security forces like the Civilian Joint task force (CJTF) Akubor and Okolo (2019), the granting of state Amnesty and forgiveness (Omokhoa & Ikelegbe, 2016), among others. In fact, in Nigeria, due to the rising spate of insecurity and lack of capacity of the conventional security forces, each region now has a specific security force (AMOTEKUN, Eastern Security Network, Ebubeagu, Neighborhood watch, among others) to complement the conventional ones. Similarly, other insecurity-prone states in Africa, like Cameroun (Multipurpose Intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie-GPIGN), Chad (Chadian Nomadic National Guard), Libya (Libyan Arab Armed Forces), among others, have adopted certain measures against insecurity. Also, at the regional and sub-regional levels, the African Union, SADC, ECOWAS, AFRICOM, and others security measures were adopted to address Africa's insecurity problem.

Despite these measures, Africa is still increasingly unsafe and insecure (FAO, 2020; ILO, 2020). For instance, one of its biggest economies, Nigeria, is currently being ravaged by unending insecurity crises. Nigeria is not safe for Nigerians, let alone foreign investors. Human lives and properties currently in Nigeria are similar to what Hobbes's described as brutish, short, nasty, and wicked in a state of nature. In 2015, before the ascension of power by the current administration, insecurity was predominant in North-East Nigeria (Akubor & Okolo, 2019; Kah, 2017; Ayoola, 2018; Imaseun, 2015; Onwusirib *et al.*, 2015; Gegout, 2018), but experiences in contemporary time, indicate that no region is free of insecurity. It ranges

\*Address correspondence to this author at the Department of Political Studies and International Relations, North-West University, Mafikeng, South Africa; E-mail: agunyais@oauife.edu.ng

from the onslaught and reprisal attacks by Fulani herders on farmers and host communities in South West to genocide attacks between the IPOB members and the Nigerian Army in the South-East or the criminal bandits' activities and farmers-herders conflicts across the North West, and partly in the North Central, and the continued attacks of the Nigerian state by Boko-Haram in the North-East, as well as the proliferation of gun-use by unknown persons (i.e., Unknown gunmen) in South-South, Nigeria. These ugly scenarios have severely contributed to insecurity not only in Nigeria but in Africa at large. This is because the fallouts of the insecurity in Nigeria affect its other neighboring African states and, by extension, the entire continent. For instance, other African countries such as South Africa have massive investments across Nigeria (such as Shoprite, MTN, PEP store, Multichoice DSTV, among others) also shares Nigeria's insecurity problem, as their businesses and stores have been severally attacked (Ayoola, 2018).

Insecurity in Nigeria has a significant effect on foreign direct investment, Ayoola (2018), Owolabi and Ayanakin, (2015), livelihood, Onyekwere, and Nworgu (2020), mobility and displacement Duerksen (2021), attainment of SDGs Ozoh and Dinwobi (2018), food security Amusan and Agunyai (2021), life expectancy, Adeleke (2013), peaceful co-existence of the state, Ngwoke and Ituma (2020), socio-economic development, Ray and Esteban (2017), diplomatic-relations, Gegout (2018) and the public image of Africa, (Santana-Gallego & Fourie, 2020). It was the cause of the sudden relocation of some FDI and multinational corporations and the loss of interest in some African countries as an investment destination. It is partly the leading cause of the increasing rate of African migrants in other continents. The case of Nigeria is very serious, as many of its citizens now risk their lives through irregular dangerous migratory routes to escape the problem of insecurity (Muhammad, 2021). Nigeria is currently more divided and disunited than it was in 1967 because of insecurity (Orji, 2019). For instance, lack of the political will to prosecute criminals and agents of insecurity from a particular ethnic group (Fulani) by the current government has unduly provoked other Nigerians, especially self-acclaimed defenders of people, to openly carry arms and ammunition under the purported claim of defending the people (Duerksen, 2021).

This, according to Mbachu and Ayandike (2021), was the leading cause of agitations for the Oduduwa nation and the renewed interests among the Igbo

youths for secession from Nigeria. Continentally and sub-regionally, the insecurity in Nigeria is a threat to Africa and other neighboring countries in West Africa. It has not only stained Nigeria's public will or image but Nigeria's hegemony and respect. For instance, smaller African states like Benin Republic, Chad, and Ghana, now sent back Nigerians from their country over the insecurity problem. One other implication of insecurity is the perpetual intensification of the climate of fear in the country. Today, Nigerians in the diaspora hardly return home due to the fear of insecurity. Nigeria is fast becoming a failed state and has fallen to a situation where virtually everything generates fear among citizens, and this has made some citizens resort to the extreme measure of calling for secession, while others still hope for restructuring as the solution (Orji, 2019). The feeling of uneasiness is evident among the silent majority as a result of insecurity. The country, no doubt, is overwhelmed by frequent cases of insecurity. The activities of some groups and citizens, especially the self-acclaimed defender of the people in recent times, have posed the most potent threats to the state's power in the control of instruments of coercion. Several arms-bearing citizens and groups are increasingly terrorizing the state and citizens with guns (Mbachu & Ayandike 2021). They openly and regularly issue threats and enforce such threats with impunity. These have made the country a no-good place for investment and attraction of MNCs (Ayoola, 2018).

The paper holds the view that if the expanding crisis of insecurity in Nigeria is not quickly checked and controlled, Nigeria may one day cease to exist as a country. This is because the insecurity problem is severe, and the government seems not to be in control of the security situation in the country. The calls to secede from Nigeria, especially the recent one on Oduduwa nation, is premised on the fact that the Nigerian government can no longer guarantee unity in diversity and people were no longer safe and have fed up with the entity called Nigeria (Mbachu & Ayandike 2021). The paper also argues that it is indeed scary, the speed with which Nigeria is falling into cataclysm due to insecurity. Some of the horrible video clips making the internet rounds of deadly attacks and burning of individuals and animals in rural villages in South West by suspected Fulani herders, assassinations of politicians, lawmakers, judges, burning of police stations, and unlawful arrest and killings in Imo state; kidnappings in almost all the entire states, massacres in Benue, Plateau, Zamfara, Borno and many other places in the country are unspeakable. The speed with which insecurity is progressively

crippling Nigeria shows that all is not well and good with Africa because whatever affects Nigeria indirectly knocks Africa. Nigeria is one of Africa's strongest sources of income; if it collapses, Africa will share the consequences of the collapse. Given this, the paper believes that showcasing to the world the magnitude of Nigeria's insecurity, especially by providing information on the new undercurrents of insecurity in Nigeria, could fashion a lasting solution.

Although studies have been conducted regarding the recurrent and recent rising cases of insecurity in Nigeria (Ayoola, 2018; Orji, 2019; Ngwoke & Ituma, 2020; Harrison, 2020; Muhammad, 2021; Duerksen, 2021), most of these academic studies have commonly looked at already known issues of poverty, governance failure, unemployment, ethnic and religious fanaticism, as causes of insecurity, very little or nothing is known on how the outbreak of the Covid-19, which adversely restricts mobility and displaced people, provokes insecurity. Specifically, not many scholars or researchers believed that the displacement of Almajiri children during Covid-19 could, in turn, exposed these children to criminals or terrorists who recruit them to terrorize the Nigerian state. Almajiri children are young people (mainly boys) entrusted by their parents or guardians under the care of an Islamic cleric (Mallam) for Koranic Islamic education. Evidence shows that most of these children often ended up begging for arms on major highways in Northern Nigeria (Orjinmo and Abubakar 2020). This, in itself, is dangerous, but displacing them during the Covid-19 outbreak over the fear of its spread is more dangerous to the security of Nigeria (Orjinmo & Abubakar, 2020). Besides, studies that have examined implications of Covid-19 on human mobility only looked at it from the perspective of restrictions of movements (Adegboyega, 2021; Schewel, 2020; Castilo & Amoah, 2020), evidence is scant on how human immobility or forceful displacement due to Covid-19 pushes them into the crime of insecurity. For instance, there was a significant increase in banditry amid Covid-19 in Nigeria (Harrison, 2020). Unlike others, this paper believes that investigating Nigeria's insecurity problem from the lens of Covid-19 and displacement of Almajiri Children would produce a significantly different result capable of advancing new knowledge on the possibility of learning new strategies of tackling insecurity in Nigeria. This aspect of the research deserves academic attention because it will help expose the extent of Nigeria's failing state and possible remedies to strengthen Nigeria's control of its security network. Given this, the

paper seeks to examine Covid-19, human displacement, and expanding crises of insecurity in Nigeria. To achieve this broad aim, it specifically examines the effect of the displaced Almajiri Children during Covid-19 on insecurity in Nigeria. It determines, if any, the Covid-19 lockdown frustrations pushes people into criminal activities. Therefore, the seeming intractability of the challenges the Covid-19 form of human displacement has posed to Nigeria's security and the continent at large is the focus of this paper.

### **CONCEPTUALIZATION: INSECURITY, HUMAN DISPLACEMENT, AND ALMAJIRI CHILDREN**

It has been established and well documented that a conflictual or insecure environment is detrimental to productive activities. It will be deceptive to expect improvement in human conditions in an insecure environment (Willett, 2001). This is because a highly tensed and insecure atmosphere creates fear and anxiety, which in the long run scare people from engaging in their normal routinized activities. Conflict takes a heavy toll on peaceful co-existence in a country, Mlambo and Dlamini (2019), human safety and sustainable development Onwusiribe *et al.* (2015). Insecurity is the feeling of danger, uncertainty, risk, and fear that tend to hinder the progressive reasoning and performance people and country. Africa's major security problem is partly provoked by conflict or violence caused by fundamentalists and bandits (Gegout, 2018). The developing world, especially Africa, is faced with civil conflicts and political instability (Willett 2001). Insecurity distorts the process of development and unity in diversity (UN, 2011; Epule *et al.*, 2012).

It displaces people from their homes, forces them into illegal and irregular migration, damages infrastructures, wipes out an entire community of people, and impoverishes its victims (Willett, 2001; FAO, 2020). The climate of fear, when an outbreak of a pandemic triggers it, like the Covid-19, especially when it is spread by human-to-human mobility, scares people from active engagement in productive activity. For instance, the outbreak of Covid-19 forced people to remain idle, distorted people's source of income, and rendered others economically poor. These are situations capable of pushing people with low morale into crimes that could trigger insecurity problems. However, causes of insecurity have been blamed on factors such as governance failure (Willett, 2001; Collier, 2000), the greed of warlords (Collier 200), religion-fanaticism (Mlambo and Dlamini 2019). The

uncontrolled proliferation of small arms (Idike & Agu, 2014), hunger, and poverty (Amusan, 2015; FAO, 2020), the current wave of insecurity in parts of Africa, like Nigeria, is not totally outside the Covid-19. The Covid-19 outbreak changes the world outlook in all spheres of life, including security dimensions. The Covid-19 lockdown, though aimed at protecting people and cutting down on the curve, also has negative side effects, which seems to outweigh the positive gains (Jibrin, 2021). For instance, the Covid-19 frustrations and loss of livelihood or means of income, especially by self-employed Africans, change the attitude of some of these groups. At the same time, it makes some more violent; it pushes others into criminal acts, which results in social injustices in urban centers (Oduntan-Wayas, Alaba, & Lambert, 2021). Insecurity is a state of worry, anxiety, shock, danger, and threat. The Covid-19 virus or pandemic shares similar attributes, including the untimely death of victims. This might have made, Oduntan-Wayas *et al.* (2021) conclude that Covid-19 is an instrument of insecurity because it creates the feeling and the atmosphere of insecurity. It was further revealed that Covid-19 also distorts the food security system apart from its human insecurity tendency. Evidence has shown that food is an instrument of war; that is, lack of it in any country could provoke insecurity (Amusan, 2017; Amusan & Agunyai 2021). Besides, insecurity is sometimes perpetrated or caused by poverty and unemployment; the Covid-19 pandemic rendered lots of people jobless, ILO (2020), and poor, Mahler *et al.* (2020); it pushes some people into crimes and insecurity activities (Felbab-Brown, 2020).

Human displacement is the deportation or expulsion of people from their residence, which could be their original dwelling or a well-known survival structure. It is imperative to note that most displacements have been forceful and sometimes very sudden and unplanned. Displacement is a global issue as about 71 million people globally have been forcefully displaced from their homes due to outbreaks of pandemics, oppression, conflicts, poverty, insecurity, and other socio-economic determinants (UNHCR, 2019). It was revealed that every two minutes, one person is forcefully displaced. Besides, the report indicates that the 2017 global displaced persons are categorized into 25.4 million grouped as refugees, 40 million internally displaced, and 3.1 million were asylum seekers. Also, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report shows that about 140,000 people were displaced by conflict, and 2000 were displaced by disasters (IDMC, 2019). It is on record that Africa hosts the

largest number of displaced persons in the world. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) (2019) and IDMC report (2019). It is important to note that insecurity is the leading driver of displacement., as people tend to move when there is a threat to their lives. For instance, Nigerian migrants are more than 75% of 655, 144 trapped migrants in Libya as of the end of August 2019.

Human displacement, according to Ong'ayo (2018), is categorized into state-related and migration-related. While state-related displacement is driven by a nation-state, imagined communities, and push and pull factors, migration-related is driven by opportunities, livelihoods, and aspirations (Ong'ayo, 2018). For this paper, more emphasis is placed on state-related displacement, which centers on identifying the root cause of threats, insecurity, and migration management in terms of settlements, returns, and circularity. The root cause of threats and insecurity concepts is specifically given attention since these concepts facilitate an understanding of the role of states in human displacement. This can be determined from how states forced or took collective action to displace people over security threats. Thus, the displacement of people, especially the Almajiri children, during the Covid-19 by states in Northern Nigeria is state-related because it is an action taken by the government of specific states in Nigeria (Akintunde, Chen, & Q Di 2020). Cheng *et al.* (2020), specifically, note that the displacement of the children due to Covid-19 in Nigeria is an infringement on the children's rights. It was observed that these children were never consulted before their deportation to their respective states. Even though it was perceived in some quarters as a good response to slow the curve of the Covid-19 (UNICEF, 2020), this action has deeper implications for the well-being of these children Campbell and Oneto (2021). The displacement could make them readily available tools in the hands of bandits and insurgents, most of whom are religious extremists (Edinyang, Basse, & Ushie, 2020). A critical review of the preceding shows that the displacement is not always willingly but forced or unplanned (Ong' ayo, 2018). It creates the feeling of hate, oppression, isolation, abandonment in victims. Evidence shows that these attitudes sometimes provoke reprisal attacks on host communities by those who felt they were wrongly displaced. Similarly, in the case of the Almajiri children, their displacement could render the children as tools in the hands of religious extremists to fight against the state. The use of suicide child bombers by Boko-Haram terrorists aptly buttressed the side effects of the

displacement of Almajiri children (Edinyang *et al.*, 2020).

Almajiri is derived from the Arabic word "Al-muhajirun", meaning migration, emigrants, or immigrants (Edinyang *et al.*, 2020). It is a system of education based on Islam or Quran teachings thought by a Mallam. It is common practice in Northern Nigeria and supported by most governments in the region. It can also be defined as a system of traditional koranic education, where parents put their children, mostly sons, under the tutelage of an Islamic cleric or teacher who teaches these children koranic education. It involves the migration of these children from their traditional abode to the abode of the Mallam, following the permission of their parents (Guardian, 2019). Almajiri connotes in Hausa land the system that allows parents, especially the poor ones, to endow their children with an Islam cleric or Mallam for Quranic education. It represents any person who begs for arms from house to house (Edinyang *et al.*, 2020). It consists of children between 5-19 years, who combine begging of arms and food on major highways or streets with their koranic education under a mallam. The begging duties of the Almajiri children are what Yushau *et al.* (2013) classified as labor to earn a wage. This shows that the begging of arms by the Almajiri children is seen as a reputable source of wage earnings. This accounts for its acceptance and open practice in Northern Nigeria. It is an Arabic word meaning migrants who have come into a place to learn Qur'anic teachings or recitations from a seasoned Islamic teacher or Mallam (Akintunde *et al.* 2020). From the preceding, it can be deduced that children under the Almajiri system are all migrants who sought precious learning or education rooted in Islamic doctrines (Shittu & Olaofe, 2015).

While this system has been very effective in molding the lives of young Muslims in Islamic doctrines by Mallams called by the holy prophet, the same cannot be said about the crop of teachers that run the system in recent times. Most of them forced the children to the streets to beg for arms instead of learning the Quran (Shittu & Olaofe, 2015). This has been the major cause of why Almajiri children are used to perpetrate so many social vices in society. Most of these children are tools in the hands of Boko-Haram terrorists deployed for suicide bombing against the Nigerian state (Danjibo, 2009; Edinyang *et al.*, 2020; Shittu & Olaofe, 2015; Akali 2015).

The Figure 1 below depicts that of unkempt, needy, and begging children. These children are supposed to

be learning Quran, but the evidence shows that most of them resort to begging for arms for their survival. This makes them prone to social vices and readily available to be used by extremists and other anti-state organizations to attack the state. This claim had been foreseen by Falola (2009) and Umar (2013) who revealed that the Almajiri system is prone to political violence, criminality, and insurgency. One of its inherent challenges is the radicalization of the young children under the Almajiri system by their Mallams, the majority of whom share the same ideology with the extremists (Purefoy, 2010).



**Figure 1:** Almajiri Children Begging for Arms in Kano State.

#### **THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION VS. STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISM**

Insecurity is provoked by both aggressive action and structural failures in terms of the inability of the government to enforce its primary duties (adequate security) to the people. The frustration-aggressive theory believes that it takes a frustrated heart or person to display an aggressive action (Dollard *et al.*, 1939). The frustration here includes disappointments, subjugation, the denial of rights, cutting-off livelihood, forceful displacement, especially from the source of legitimate income abode, unlawful cheats, and others that tend to prevent the progress and development of a person. All of these actions are capable of provoking an aggressive action from the victim. This is akin to the problem of insecurity in Nigeria. Today, some of the current insecurity threats and attacks in Nigeria are provoked by frustrations such as (selective or one-sided distribution of Covid-19 palliatives, harassment meted to citizens by Special Anti-Robbery Squad-SARS, unchecked attacks by Fulani on other ethnic groups, Covid-19 lockdown-leading to loss of livelihoods, immobility, among others). For instance, the selective distribution of Covid-19 palliatives amid the Covid-19 pandemic was enough frustration that led to the aggressiveness of Nigerians to let loose hidden Covid-19 palliatives in some warehouses across the country (Duerksen, 2021).



**Figure 2:** Protests against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Nigeria.

Duerksen, (2021).

Similarly, the END SARS protest was staged by frustrated Nigerians, mostly the youth, who are fed up with the oppression and inhuman treatment by SARS. However, this theory, as popularized by Dollard *et al.* (1939), was criticized because apart from aggressive behavior, frustration also provokes feelings of depression; Seligman (1975) increases prejudice and affects development (Grossarth *et al.*, 1989). Contrary to the view of Dollard and Morlan (1949), they argued that aggressive acts rarely occur in isolation but have future consequences. A critical look at the submissions of these theorists showed that Insecurity in Nigeria is the consequence of aggressive actions from frustrated people. The sudden outbreak of the Covid-19 and its lockdown, which restricts people cut off daily earnings of the self-employed, terminates some people's livelihood, stampedes businesses, trade, slows down farming for food security, shuts out children from school, displaces people (Almajiri) among others, frustrated a lot of people and provoked not only an aggressive action (END SARS protest, vandalization of warehouses for Covid-19 palliatives, sliding into crimes, bandits, armed robbery to cover up for the loss of daily income). But depression (lots of Nigerians were sad, hopeless during the lockdown), prejudice (selective or bias in the distribution of Covid-19 palliatives), and limited development (the global fall in oil price due to Covid-19 lockdown. It severely affects Nigeria's development (Duerksen, 2021; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2020; Inegbedion, 2021).

Structural-functionalism is a theory that submits that in all political systems, there are structures that perform certain functions to enhance the smooth running of the country (Roberta, 2019). It argues that failure to perform these functions would upset the political system and may likely push beneficiaries into revolt against institutions or structures in charge of such functions when services are not forthcoming as expected. It will be deceptive to expect cooperation and stability in a political system where institutions fail to perform their statutory duties (Willett, 2001). This theory aptly applies to Nigeria's insecurity situation in several ways. First, the failure of some state governments to provide a regular update on Covid-19 palliatives and their deliberate actions to hoard palliatives led to the damage and the looting of Covid-19 palliatives in some warehouses across the country. Secondly, the collective actions of state governors to ban the Almajiri system due to the Covid-19 was perceived as a deceitful action skewed to disfavor and displace the Almajiri children by governors who never wanted to be responsible for the cost of treating any of the children affected by the virus, due to their huge population. This failure from the government made the children amenable to bandits and extremists who used them to attack the state (Umar 2013). For instance, some of these children are informants to kidnapers, bandits, and insurgents (Danjibo, 2009).

Even though it was aggressive actions to protest the frustrations suffered from SARS, the END SARS further provoked the insecurity problem in Nigeria. The


Nigerian army responded aggressively by shooting at protesters to dislodge them from occupying major highways. Still, this action further led to an aggressive response from protesters who went on a rampage attacking properties and functionaries of the state. For instance, in addition to the damage of public, commercial buses belonging to Lagos State, several other institutions across the country (police stations, courts, prisons, among others) were burnt by the angered protesters, who also attacked traditional institutions. This protest attracted reactions across the globe and exposes the failure of the Nigerian government in handling the frustrations leading to aggression from its citizens. To date, these frustrations still linger and recurrently constitute security threats in Nigeria.

**COVID-19, DISPLACEMENT OF ALMAJIRI CHILDREN, AND INSECURITY IN NIGERIA**

The point being made here is that Covid-19 not only inflicts on its victims' deadly disease that has no cure. But it also created several frustrations, ranging from human immobility, Susan and Jonas (2021), displacement (UNHCR, 2020), temporary or permanent cutting-off of means of livelihood, ACCORD (2020),

and closure of schools. It renders learners idle and exposes them to social vices, especially those from locations without internet, which tend to or push some people into aggressive actions. From the analysis of theories above, it is clear that frustrations and governance failure in terms of the inability of government institutions to adequately deliver their functions as expected to the people provoke aggressive actions that sometimes create feelings of insecurity and depression. For instance, in Nigeria, during the lockdown, there were more cases of theft and armed robbery. Similarly, since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, crimes such as kidnapping, bandits, clashes between host communities and Fulani herders in Southern Nigeria, have risen (Harrison, 2020).

It was specifically noted that the outbreak of the Covid-19 aggravated the insecurity situation in Nigeria, which has been worsened by the onslaught of Boko-Haram insurgents, bandits, and militants (Harrison, 2020). Amid Covid-19, Boko-Haram continues with its onslaught against on the Nigerian state and security forces. While pre-Covid-19 attacks were more focused on civilians, but amid Covid-19, they shifted focus on security forces (Harrison, 2020). For instance, in March



**Figure 3:** Regional dimension of insecurity in Nigeria. Duerksen, (2021).

2020, the early period of Covid-19 in Nigeria, 50 Nigerian armed forces were killed in Goneri, Yobe state. Four policemen and two militiamen also lost their lives in Damboa, Borno state (Aljazeera, 2020). However, the Nigerian armed forces use the opportunity of the Covid-19 lockdown, which restricted movement and make citizens stayed more in their houses, to neutralized camps and killed Boko-Haram insurgents. At the early lockdown period, precisely between March 21 and 23, 2020, 200 insurgents were killed by the Nigerian armed forces Alagarno, Borno State (Kola, 2020). Similarly, the Nigerian armed forces recorded some successes in neutralizing their camps and massive killings of the militants in places like Geidam local government area of Yobe State and Baga, Borno State. Despite these successes, the Boko-Haram insurgents still launch occasional attacks on the Nigerian armed forces amid Covid-19.

Moreover, amid Covid-19, bandits use the opportunity of the lockdown to continue with kidnappings and killings of citizens. Before Covid 19, banditry is a product of hunger, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and frustrations. Bandits are criminal groups specializing in kidnapping, community armed robbery, and hired assassins but are predominant in North-West Nigeria. Covid-19 and its frustrations further empower these groups to engage in a high-profile damaging insecurity onslaught on citizens. It is imperative to note that while Boko-Haram attacks the Nigerian state, bandits attack citizens and civilians. The lockdown created more avenues for them to easily access their targets for kidnapping or outright killing, as the case may be. For example, few days after Nigeria's first Covid-19 case, on March 2, 2020, bandits went on a rampage and killed 50 people in Kaduna villages (Minda, Kerewa, & Zareyawa, 2020). There were other cases of bandits' onslaught in places like katsina (47 people dead April 18, 2020), Niger (Shiroro and Rafi local government. Leaving six people dead on 14-15 April 2020), Hazzad (2020), and Sokoto State (Sabon Birni District, leaving 60 people dead May 28, 2020)(Khalid, 2020).

A critical review of views above shows that, unlike the Boko-Haram, the Covid-19 lockdown, which was aimed at slowing down the spread of the virus, aided the illicit onslaught of bandits against Nigerian citizens. The lockdown availed them the opportunity to catch their targets and dislodge them of their monies and valuables. It was also reported that the Covid-19 lured most idle youths and others whose trade or source of income was affected by the lockdown into banditry.

There was a sharp increase in the number of bandits in Nigeria during Covid-19, as most criminally minded people were now involved (Kola, 2020). For instance, the displacement of the Almajiri children back to their state of origin and parents, even though it seems to be a good idea because the children are now closer to their parents (UNICEF, 2020). The struggle then is, could some parents who initially gave their children out for koranic studies due to poverty, now adequately care for them? The point being made here is that the displacement of these children, without adequate provision for their welfare by the receiving states or parents, would unduly expose the children to crimes and make them readily markets for recruiters of suicide bombers. Many suicide bombers used by Boko-Haram and other extremists are brainwashed children from Northern Nigeria, some of whom could be Almajiri children. Danjibo (2009) and Crisis Group (2010) revealed how the Almajirai has gradually relapsed into local armed gangs and the biggest security considerations for the government. Since it takes a radicalizing mind to engage in a suicide bombing, Purefoy's (2010) findings that the Almajiri system is a means of radicalizing the Almajirai further confirms that some of the displaced Almajiri children, due to Covid-19, may be involved in ravaging attacks from the Boko-Haram, bandits, herders, kidnappers, and other insecurity mallei.

Long before the displacement of Almajiri children, scientific evidence indicates a correlation between the Almajiri system and insurgency (Akali, 2015). Findings from Purefoy's (2010) were particularly more revealing as they indicated that the Almajiri schools are run by extremists, who use the children for reprisal attacks on the state and government buildings, for cracking down on their activities. Ngbea and Achunike (2014) concluded that it had pushed the Almajiri children to crimes and, most recently, the Islamic radicalization of the Boko-Haram. A critical review of these findings showed that even before the outbreak of Covid-19, some Almajiri children had been exposed to crimes, delinquents, and terrorists who use them for attacks on the Nigerian state. Thus, their displacement, which makes them more susceptible, because they are used to roaming about streets for begging, contributes immensely to their involvement in banditry. Specifically, since the outbreak of the Covid-19 in 2020, the rate of banditry is continually rising, as there are more cases of kidnappings in Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, and other states in northwest Nigeria. The deportation of Almajiri children, some of whom are trained experts in

community crimes, information gathering, and dissemination, further intensified banditry at the rural communities in Northern Nigeria.

Dibussi (2012) gives an account of how Almajiri children constitute foot soldiers for the Boko-Haram insurgency. Almajiri koranic schools are breeding grounds for foot armies of religious extremists who unleash attacks on society (Soyinka, 2012). However, studies like Adesoji (2011) and Akali (2015) have criticized the hasty generalization of Almajiri children as foot soldiers of the Boko-Haram insurgency because Boko-Haram doesn't disclose their identity. But it is a fact that these children are sometimes very idle and hungry, which makes them beg for food, clothing, and arms. The point then is, couldn't it be possible that these children would prefer to work and be foot soldiers for Boko-Haram extremists, who feed, cloth, and promise them of making haul Jana (heaven). Since Boko-Haram's teaching on making heaven, through the killings of infidels, looks similar to that of their Mallam It is very likely that hungry, unclothed, and wallowing Almajiri children would prefer to become fully fed, clothed, and heavenly-minded Boko-Haram insurgents than to remained as street beggars. Thus, their displacement due to Covid-19 is exposed them being used by bandits and insurgents, specifically in information sharing about targets and victims of kidnappings. The begging tenacity of Almajiri children seems to allow them to be closer to people, hence, their precision in predicting the movement of people in the neighborhood. Like Soyinka, Danjibo (2009) reported that part of the duties of Almajiri children as Boko-Haram foot soldiers is the release of information about the movement of the Nigerian armed forces; hence, their ambush and killings by Boko-Haram insurgents. The point then is that the displacement of Almajiri children during the Covid-19 exposes some of them to being used as agents of insecurity in the country.

In addition to the displacement of Almajiri, the lockdown seems to have some security implications. First, while the Nigerian security forces are cautious of the lockdown order, in terms of following through the Covid-19 safety protocols, the bandits became more deadly in their attacks on citizens. In most uncontrolled and ungoverned rural villages, the lockdown made it very easy for bandits to attack their victims unrestricted (Harrison, 2020; Attah *et al.*, 2021; Kola, 2020). Specifically noted that as of March 2020, four thousand people had been displaced in the Kaduna States, and scores of others were killed due to banditry (West

Africa Network for Peacebuilding, 2020). Similarly, in Zamfara state, about 10000 houses were damaged, and 1487,800 vehicles were stolen by bandits (Hamrouni, 2020). Secondly, some self-employed people, who lost their source of income and business without any compensation or support from the government during the lockdown, resort to crimes to feed their families. These crimes range from armed robbery to banditry, gun-gangs for kidnapping, stealing, and illegal gold mining. Campbell *et al.* (2020) specifically observed that the lack of support for the self-employed, who have lost their viable source of daily income by the Nigerian government, drives some of them into insecurity ventures. The bandits took advantage of the lockdown and bans on inter-state movement to attack their victims who are lockdown at home. (Attah *et al.*, 2021). Thus, the previous analyses have shown that Covid-19 is at the center of insecurity in Nigeria. The lockdown aided the activities of criminals and intensified ravaging attacks on Nigerians and the Nigerian state. These attacks seem to have gone out of control, as the whole country is almost overwhelmed by daily attacks from all the country's six geopolitical regions. Currently, Nigeria is described as a failed state because of insecurity and disunity in the country's diversity. This has implications for regional and sub-regional security in the continent (Al Jazeera Africa, 2020).

## CONCLUSION

The Covid-19, since its outbreak, has bequeathed to the world the new normal; part of the characteristic components of the new normal is insecurity. Still, the extent to which this menace is persistent and ravaging seems to have earned Nigeria the name, failed state. The lockdown, even though aimed at protection, aided and triggered insecurity in Africa, including Nigeria. The Covid-19, instead of creating the fear of catching the virus in criminals, pushes them more into criminal attacks on citizens, which has left many dead and injured. This has implications for Nigeria's reputation and socio-economic development. Africa and Nigeria, in particular, have lost so many opportunities due to insecurity. The relocation of some FDI or companies and threats from others to leave Nigeria for safer countries is partly due to the rising cases of insecurity. While studies have investigated this menace from a lens other than the Covid-19, it has been found that the Covid-19 partly contributed to Nigeria's rising insecurity profile. Its lockdown exacerbated the multifaceted insecurity crone that is currently pushing Nigeria to the brink of its collapse.

## POLICY DIRECTIONS/SUGGESTIONS

The onus is on the Nigerian government to re-strategies, call for dialogue, make concessions, and actively engage those who may have unduly tapped into loopholes inherent in the Covid-19 lockdown and the hurting citizens or groups back into the loop. It is a fact that apart from the selective distribution of Covid-19 palliatives and inadequate support from the government, the perceived inability of the government to prosecute criminals from Fulani ethnic groups has provoked many Nigerians to bear arms to protect themselves against attacks. Ultimately, this is necessary because if things get out of control and the country collapses, the President and his government would be blamed. Good policy initiatives that tend to address the root cause of insecurity will certainly help reduce insecurity in the country.

This is the time for speedy approval and lawful backing for community policing. Banditry is a community-level crime that causes insecurity; Nigeria's central security system cannot effectively overcome or eradicate it. There is a need to intensify and speedily grant legal backing for community policing. This will go a long way in eradicating attacks from bandits against citizens at the community level. It is important because the community security forces, especially when the officers are drawn on a community basis, would fish out the criminals and their informants.

There is a need for the government to intensify its efforts in rescuing businesses and sources of income of daily-income earners or the self-employed from collapsing by injecting more funds into Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs). This will go a long way in restoring sanity to many people in this category to desist from criminal activities.

Besides, rather than just deporting the Almajiri children back to their state of origin, adequate care should be provided by the government and non-governmental organizations to complement that of their parents, if any. This would go a long way to create a sense of belonging in them and shun crime.

Lastly, the government should adequately fund and support the conventional security forces, especially regarding providing them with state-of-the-art weapons and ammunitions to combat insecurity in the country.

## REFERENCES

- ACCORD (2020). COVID-19: Livelihood and food insecurity. Available online at: <https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/covid-19-livelihood-food-insecurity/> Retrieved on 19/06/2021
- Adegboyega A. O (2021). The Impact of COVID-19 on African Migrants and Mobility in South Africa. *African Journal of Development Studies*, 11(1): 275-288. <https://doi.org/10.31920/2634-3649/2021/v11n1a13>
- Adeleke, A. (2013). Insecurity: A Threat to Human Existence and Economic Development in Nigeria. *Public Policy and Administration Research* 3(6): 8-13. <https://doi.org/10.2979/africanfpeacrevi.5.2.128>
- Akali, O. (2015). The Almajiri in Northern Nigeria: Militancy, Perceptions, Challenges, and State Policies. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 5(2): 128-142.
- Akintunde, T.Y., Chen, & S Q Di (2020). Public health implication of displacement of Almajiri children in specific states of Northern Nigeria amidst COVID-19 pandemic. *Ethics Med Public Health*, 14:100544. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep.2020.100544>
- Akubor, A. A., and Okolo, B. I. (2019). Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Implications for national security and restorative justice. *Accord*. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/boko-haram-insurgency-in-nigeria>.
- Aljazeera (2020) 'Six Killed in Attack on Nigeria Military Base' *Aljazeera*, March 4, Available at: <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/killed-attack-nigeria-military-base-200304135023445.html>> [Accessed June 2 2021].
- Aljazeera (2020) 'At Least 50 Nigerian Soldiers Killed In Boko Haram Ambush' *Aljazeera*, May 24, Available at: <[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/50-nigerian-soldiers-killed-boko-haram-ambush-200324185317954.html?utm\\_source=website&utm\\_medium=article\\_page&utm\\_campaign=read\\_more\\_links](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/50-nigerian-soldiers-killed-boko-haram-ambush-200324185317954.html?utm_source=website&utm_medium=article_page&utm_campaign=read_more_links)> [Accessed May 29 2021].
- Amusan, Lere & Agunyai, S. C. (2021). The COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis of lockdowns in Nigeria: The household food security perspective. *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, 9(1): 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.4102/apsdpr.v9i1.484>
- Attah, N. E., Sambo, U., Sule, B., Bello, M. A., & Saragih, M. Y (2021). COVID 19 and Increased Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria: Interrogating Armed Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Studies*, 6(1) :33-44. <https://doi.org/10.33258/siasat.v6i1.87>
- Ayola, A. O. (2018). Insecurity and Major Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research*, 4(1): 54-63. <https://doi.org/10.6000/2371-1655.2018.04.06>
- Attah, N. E., Sambo, U., Sule, B., Bello, M. A., & Saragih, M. Y (2021). COVID 19 and Increased Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria: Interrogating Armed Banditry in Northwestern Nigeria. *Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Studies*, 6(1) :33-44. <https://doi.org/10.33258/siasat.v6i1.87>
- Campbel, S., & Oneto, C. C. (2021). Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on children: An ethical analysis with a global-child lens. *Global Studies of Childhood*, 11(1): 105–114. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2043610620976142>
- Castillo, R., & Amoah, P. A. (2020). Africans in post-COVID-19 pandemic China is there a future for China's 'new minority'? *Asian Ethnicity*, 1-6. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2020.1773760>
- Cheng TL, Moon M, Artman M, et al. (2020) Shoring up the safety net for children in the COVID-19 pan-demic. *Pediatric Research* 88(3): 349–351. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41390-020-1071-7>
- Danjibo, N. (2009). "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." [http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N\\_-\\_D\\_-\\_DANJIBO\\_-\\_Islamic\\_Fundamentalism\\_and\\_Sectarian\\_Violence\\_The](http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/N_-_D_-_DANJIBO_-_Islamic_Fundamentalism_and_Sectarian_Violence_The)

- Dollard, J., Miller, N. E., Doob, L. W., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). *Frustration and aggression*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
<https://doi.org/10.1037/10022-000>
- Duerksen, M. (2021). Nigeria's Diverse Security Threats. *African Centre for Strategic Studies*
- Edinyang, S. D., Bassey, M. R., & Ushie, D. E. (2020). Almajiri System of Education and the Emergence of Religious Extremists in Nigeria. *Journal of Educational and Social Research* 10(2): 103-111.  
<https://doi.org/10.36941/jesr-2020-0030>
- Epule, E.T., Peng, C., Lepage, L. & Chen, Z., (2012), 'Poverty and Gender Oriented Vulnerabilities to Food and Water Scarcity in Touroua, Cameroon', *Journal of Human Ecology* 38 (2): 81–90.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09709274.2012.11906477>
- Falola, T. (2009). *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2020). How COVID-19 is changing law enforcement practices by police and by criminal groups. *Brookings*, available on <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/07/how-covid-19-is-changing-law-enforcement-practices-by-police-and-by-criminal-groups/>. Retrieved on 15/06/2021.
- Gegout, C. (2018). *Why Europe intervenes in Africa: Security prestige and the legacy of colonialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190845162.001.0001>
- Grossarth-Maticzek, R., Eysenck, H. J., & Vetter, H. (1989). The causes and cures of prejudice: An empirical study of the frustration-aggression hypothesis. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 10(5), 547–558.  
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869\(89\)90037-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(89)90037-8)
- Hamrouni, S.M. (2020). "More than 30, 000 Refugees Flee Violence in Northwest Nigeria in Last Two Months Alone". UNHCR, The UN Refugee Council. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2020/6/5ef5e99e4/30000-refugees-flee-violence-northwestern-nigeria-months-alone.html> on July 14, 2020 at 11:37 am.
- Harrison, A. I. (2020). Reappraising Conflict Trends in Nigeria amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic. *ACCORD, conflict Trends*/3. Available online at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reappraising-conflict-trends-in-nigeria-amidst-the-covid-19-pandemic/> Retrieved On 16/06/2021
- Hazzad, Ardo (2020) 'Armed Bandits Kill 47 in Northwest Nigeria's Katsina State: Police' *Reuters*, April 19, Available at: <<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/srticles/2020-04-19/armed-bandits-kill-47-in-northwest-nigerias-katsina-state-police>> [Accessed June 19 2021].
- Inegbedion, H (2021). Impact of COVID-19 on economic growth in Nigeria: opinions and attitudes. *Heliyon* 7(1): 1-8.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e06943>
- International Labor Organizations (2020). *The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on jobs and incomes in G20 economies*. Being an ILO-OECD paper prepared at the request of G20 Leaders Saudi Arabia's G20 Presidency 2020
- Jibrin, I. (2021). Insecurity and Covid-19: Threats to electoral democracy in Africa. *Mail and Guardian*, available online at <https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-04-14-insecurity-and-covid-19-threats-to-electoral-democracy-in-africa/>, Retrieved on 15/06/2021
- Kah, H.K., (2017), "Boko Haram is Losing, But so is Food Production": Conflict and Food Insecurity in Nigeria and Cameroon, *Africa Development*, 42(3): 177-196
- Khalid, Ishaq (2020) 'Gunmen Kill Dozens of Nigerians in Broad Day Light', *BBC News*, May 28, Available at: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c50znx8v132t/nigeria>> [Accessed June 19 2021].
- Kola, Olarewaju (2020) '200 Boko Haram Militants Killed in Nigeria: Official', *Anadolu Agency*, March 25, Available at: <<https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/200-boko-haram-militants-killed-in-nigeria-official/1778380>> [Accessed May 29 2021]
- Mabikke, S. B. (2012). *Africa's Wealth of Resources, Blessing or Curse*. Being a paper presented at expert Conference Organized at the European Academy Otzenhausen (Saarland), January 18th -20th, 2012
- Mahler, D. G., Lakner, C., Aguilar, R. A. C. Haoyu Wu (2020). *The impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) on global poverty: Why Sub-Saharan Africa might be the region hardest hit*. World Bank Data Blog. Available on <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/impact-covid-19-coronavirus-global-poverty-why-sub-saharan-africa-might-be-region-hardest>. Retrieved on 15/06/2021.
- Mbachu, D., & Ayandike, O. (2021). Nigeria's unhappy union: How growing insecurity threatens the country's future. *The New Humanitarian*, Available online at <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/Analysis/2021/4/8/how-growing-insecurity-threatens-nigerias-future>.
- Mlambo, V. H., & Dlamini, M. (2019). Conflict and violence in Africa in the 21st century: Where are the African Union? A case of Libya, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic. *J Public Affairs*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.193>
- Morlan, G. K. (1949). A note on the frustration-aggression theories of Dollard and his associates. *Psychological Review*, 56(1), 1–8.  
<https://doi.org/10.1037/h0056948>
- Moti, U. G. (2019). Africa's Natural Resource Wealth: A Paradox of Plenty and Poverty. *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 6(7):483-504.  
<https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.67.6814>
- Muhammad, M., (2015), 'Boko Haram Insurgency Gnawing at Nigeria's Food Supply', <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-01/boko-haram-insurgencygnawing-at-nigeria-s-food-supply>, accessed June 7 2021.
- Muhammad, Y. U. (2021). The Irregular Migration and Security Challenges in North-Western Nigeria. *The International Journal of Social Sciences World (TIJOSW)*, 3(01), 1-14. Retrieved from <https://www.growingscholar.org/journal/index.php/TIJOSW/article/view/56>
- Ngwoke, P.N. & Ituma, E.A., 2020, 'Ethno-religious conflict and sustainable development in Nigeria', *HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies* 76(4), a6090.  
<https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v76i4.6090>
- Oduntan-Wayas, F. A., Alaba, O. A., & Lambert, E. V (2021). Food insecurity and social injustice: The plight of urban poor African immigrants in South Africa during the COVID-19 crisis. *Glob Public Health* 16(1):149-152.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1854325>
- Omokhoa, I. E., & Ikelegbe, A. (2016). Amnesty Programme in Nigeria: The Impact and Challenges in Post Conflict Niger Delta, Region. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 21(4): 62-65.
- Ong'ayo, A. O. (2018). Displacement and Cross-Border Mobility in the Great Lakes Region Re-thinking Underlying Factors and Implications for Regional Management of Migration. *Africa insight* 48(1): 62-85.
- Onyekwere, I. A., & Nworgu, K. O. (2020). Threats to Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria: Implications for Social Order and Crisis Management. *Advances in Applied Sociology*, 10, 41-60.  
<https://doi.org/10.4236/aasoci.2020.103004>
- Orji, S. (2019). Can Buhari win over his enemies to unite a deeply divided Nigeria? *The Guardian*, Available online at <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/may/29/can-buhari-win-over-his-enemies-to-unite-a-deeply-divided-nigeria>

- Orjinmo, N & Abubakar, M (2020). Coronavirus in Nigeria: The child beggars at the heart of the outbreak. *BBC News*, available online at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52617551>., Retrieved on 15/06/2021.
- Owolabi A. & Ayenakin, O. O. (2015). "Insecurity and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria," *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Policy*, *Conscientia Beam*, vol. 4(4): 56-68. <https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.26/2015.4.4/26.4.56.68>
- Ozoh, J. N., & Dinwobi, K. S. (2018). Insecurity and Sustainable Development in Nigeria (in Context of Terrorism). *Asian Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting*, 7(2): 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.9734/AJEBA/2018/41482>
- Purefoy, C. (2010). "Nigeria's Almajiri Children Learning a Life of Poverty and Violence." CNN, January 8. <http://cnn.it/1dkq7uq>
- Ray, D. & Esteban, J., (2017) 'Conflict and development', *Annual Review of Economics* 9(1), 263–293. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080205>
- Roberta T. G. (2019). *Structural-Functional Theory*. Wiley Online. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeoss289.pub2>
- Santana-Gallego, M., & Fourie, J. (2020). Tourism falls apart: How insecurity affects African tourism. *Tourism Economics* 20(10): 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354816620978128>
- Schewel, K. (2020). Understanding Immobility: Moving Beyond the Mobility Bias in Migration Studies. *International Migration Review* 54(2): 328-355. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918319831952>
- Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). *Helplessness: On depression, development, and death*. San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
- Shittu, A. B., & Olaofe, M. A (2015). Situations of the Al-Majiri system of Education in Contemporary Nigeria: Matters Arising. *Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies*, 5(2): 37-46.
- Susan, M., & Jonas, B. (2021). (I'm)mobility in the Age of COVID-19. *International Migration Review*, 20(10): 1-28 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918320984104>
- Umar, A. M. (2013). "Nigeria and Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis." PhD diss., Naval Postgraduate School
- United Nations Development Programme (2020). Socio-Economic Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria. *Green Policy Platform*, <https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/research/socio-economic-impact-covid-19-pandemic-nigeria>
- UN, (2011), The Right to Adequate Food in Cameroon: The Second and Third Periodic Report (art. 1-15) of Cameroon to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Doc. E/C.12/CMR/2-3
- UNICEF (2020). Children adjust to life outside Nigeria's Almajiri system. Available online <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/stories/children-adjust-life-outside-nigerias-almajiri-system>. Retrieved on 16/06/2021.
- UNHCR (2020). COVID-19, Displacement and Climate Change. Available online at [https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/fileadmin/Dokumente/2020/200727\\_COVID-19\\_and\\_mi](https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/fileadmin/Dokumente/2020/200727_COVID-19_and_mi). Retrieved on 19/06/2021
- West Africa Network for Peace Building (2020). *Addressing Armed Banditry in the North West Region of Nigeria: Exploring the Potentials of Multi-Dimensional Conflict Management Approach*. Abuja, Nigeria: WANEP.

Received on 22-07-2021

Accepted on 26-08-2021

Published on 05-11-2021

<https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.165>

© 2021 Agunyai and Ojatorotu; Licensee Lifescience Global.

This is an open access article licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>) which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the work is properly cited.