Peacebuilding Strategies in Nigeria's Ethnic Space: Specific Focus on Conflict-Spot in Kaduna Communities

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Abstract: This paper contextualised the subject matter and its strategies by providing insights on the development, peace and conflict in the Nigerian environment; explicating the peace and conflict impact assessment; exposing the causal factors for communal conflict; and analysing the strategies across the main tribes in Nigeria with specific focus on Kaduna communities. It drew largely on secondary sources whose contents were explicitly analysed for this contextual discourse. It found out that there were internal mechanisms put in place towards engendering peace building across the major tribes in Nigeria. It enlisted obtainable peacebuilding strategies in Kaduna communities. It concluded that a remarkable feature of the peace building strategies is that it does not only aim at conflict resolution, but also ensures peaceful co-existence scenes and harmonious relationships between and among conflicting people or communities. However, the latter still remains challenging owing to a low human development index and civic orientations.

Keywords: Peace Building, Ethnic Group, Communal Conflict, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment.

INTRODUCTION

The necessity for peace building in the development process developed in Nigeria as a result of the country's ongoing war disorders, which continue to jeopardize development efforts (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). Poverty and underdevelopment are commonly known to exacerbate violent conflict as a result of vulnerability caused by social vices. Somalia, the Great Lakes Region, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, among others, are good instances of this in Africa. Nigeria is not an outlier in this dialectical link of poverty, underdevelopment, and violent conflict; she is not unique in this regard (Osaretim & Akov, 2013). Nigeria saw a civil war between 1967 and 1970 that had a profound influence on national growth, placing the country's corporate existence in jeopardy.

Nigeria obtained political independence in 1960. Several administrations have controlled the nation, mostly democratic and military, both with a minimal ability for people-driven and peace-building initiatives (NEEDS, 2004). Many of these administrations' judgments on the location, style, and timing of a peace intervention were based on the whims and caprices of policymakers who had little understanding of the complexities involved and the interface of conflict, particularly given Nigeria's diverse character. In addition to historical precedents, many conflict resolution training workshops and brainstorming sessions have been organized, as well as conferences focused at resolving conflicts (Strategic Conflict Assessment, 2003). In January 2000, Nigeria's federal government founded the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) as a strategic response to the country's conflict problems. Institutional effect and development processes, on the other hand, remain indifferent to the country's conflict dynamics (Strategic Conflict Assessment, 2003). A paradigm shift in favor of conflict-sensitive development programming is required to enhance Nigeria's peacebuilding efforts. This shift advances peace building in development with a long-term impact. This is, therefore, an essential first step.

As a consequence, the International Peace Research Institute (IPCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) worked to design a standard framework for peacebuilding efforts and reconcile the numerous detrimental effects of development initiatives on peace and conflict in Nigeria. The IPCR and UNICEF are hopeful that the framework would help Nigeria achieve a conflict-sensitive, people-driven, and long-term development regime (Strategic Conflict Assessment, 2003; NEEDS, 2004; Remi, 2007). As a consequence of this collaborative and institutional cooperation, Nigeria is better positioned to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) outlined in the NEEDS report from 2004 and other development

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instruments. In Nigeria, the framework includes human rights-based approaches to peacebuilding and development initiatives.

However, little or no attention has been geared towards contextualising the evident framework of peace building across major tribes into the national framework embarked upon by IPCR and UNICEF. In an attempt to fill this gap, this paper contextualises the subject matter and its strategies by providing insights on the development, peace and conflict in the Nigerian Environment; explicating the peace and conflict impact assessment; exposing the causal factors for communal conflict; and analysing the strategies across the main tribes in Nigeria, with specific focus on Kaduna communities.

METHODOLOGY

This paper heavily relies on secondary data sources, including books, journal articles (both print and online), government documents, and conference proceedings on the topics at hand. The main argument for this type of data collection is to use complete and detailed information from existing literature for robust and illuminating discussion of the topic. Additionally, content analysis was used to compile the data from the secondary sources.

Development, Peace and Conflict in the Nigerian Environment

The present destabilization of development in Nigeria is the result of a long history of insufficient planning capability at the micro (individual), meso (community), and macro (nation) levels (Oshita, 2005). The political economics of systemic corruption, the appropriation and control of the enormous earnings accruable to this sector, and the politics of oil exploitation are all examples of centrifugal forces of conflict in the development environment. Two aspects may be used to provide a comprehensive picture of social realities: progress and conflict. They both shape Nigeria's political economy in positive and negative forms respectively. Development and conflict, according to Remi (2007), go far beyond an opposite relationship. This is because the context of development in some parts of the Nigerian environment may likely pose a violent threat to some other parts due to social dynamics.

The choices of development in Nigeria, just like any other third world countries, must be moderated in an ultimate and sustainable manner that will tame the risk of violent conflict and contribute to peace building. This is clearly a huge issue for a country with a low human development index (NEEDS, 2004) and newly developed governance structures. As a result, this difficulty must be met with an urgent solution that encourages the development of institutional capacities in Nigeria's development programs.

Conflicts could either be resource-based, social, political, ethnic identity or political (Schmeltzer, 2005). However, specific stage and the context of development are claimed to be best examined if their root causes can be addressed, harnessed and sustained for some other development efforts. Furthermore, the processes of development often defy the existing political, cultural and socio-economic equations in ways that could, in turn, impede the wishes, aspirations, and interest of individuals, groups or communities (Nyheim *et al*. 2001). The constructive response of the stakeholders to protracted conflicts largely determines if such conflicts will likely enhance or jeopardise the peace of the environment.

Empirical examples have shown in conflict scenarios in Nigeria which would serve to illustrate the reciprocal impact of development and conflict. In the Niger Delta region, the development interventions by oil companies are noticeably conflict-ridden, thus causing serious injuries to human life and property and damaging the ecosystem of the region (Falade *et al*. 2004). The scenarios of conflict profile in the region have dimensional influence from the context, the parties, the government, oil companies and the communities of the area.

Indeed, the exacerbation of conflicts has purposive economic values. It is a truism that host communities to the benefit from the Oil multinationals are numerous Corporate Social Responsibilities (CSRs) among other incentives (NEEDS, 2004; Remi, 2007). This underlines the susceptibility of any community to conflict because of economic values. Peace, therefore, becomes missing factor among communities of a long-age relationship. Peace development should thus be understood to be pursuit of the unflinching well-being of individuals, groups, and communities. As a result, Falade *et al*. (2004) proposed that the government, oil companies, and constituent communities in the Niger Delta use development initiatives that adhere to the 'do no harm' philosophy.

In the crisis of *Ife-Modakeke* in Osun State, the issues with locating of a Local Government Area

escalated to an inter-communal crisis for about four years (Folami & Olaiya, 2015). The underscoring point for these few scenarios depicted that the socio-political realities need further development intervention in many otherwise 'peaceful' communities in Nigeria so as to avoid their predisposition to violent conflict.

According to Schmeltzer (2005), development efforts do not always stabilize peace as a crucial instrument of social livelihood because development is about crucial transformation, and change often creates political and social dislocations; its improper application may exacerbate existing violent conflict or even stir up new ones. In other words, it has been stated that an influence on the peace and conflict environment is unavoidable, which might be good or bad, direct or indirect, purposeful or inadvertent. Given this fundamental truth, the framework for mainstreaming peace building with potential influence on peace and conflict dynamics should be proactive responses to any of these situations.

In reality, politicians, bureaucrats and other stakeholders have the opportunities to interplay the development interventions in ethnicity, religion and indigene-settler issues. This act becomes cautionary as it seems capable of springing up sentimental outlook on social issues. Falade *et al*. (2004) admonished that the conflict disorder may manifest when community is put under intense pressure on development intervention that should rather advance the socio-economic well-being of its people. The reality of this position is obvious in the few empirical examples cited in Niger Delta and Osun state in Southwestern Nigeria. What seems incumbent therefore is that peace building is not only an assignment when conflict occurs; rather it involves long-term preventive measures before, during and after a conflict.

This approach to peacebuilding aids peace recovery and sustainability in communities that have experienced violent conflict. The concept is being used as a toolkit for reconciliation, social reconstruction, and peacebuilding in this context. The peace improvement framework prioritizes addressing the conflict's core causes, as well as ensuring fairness, justice, and inclusion, as well as economic and political empowerment (Nyheim *et al*. 2001; Lange, 2004). Individuals, groups, and communities would be empowered to take responsibility of their affairs in a peaceful environment if this framework was properly monitored by local institutions, NGOs, and INGOs, rather than becoming recipients of humanitarian aid (NEEDS, 2004). Community participation in every development initiative should be encouraged since it gives people more opportunities to uncover and appreciate their leadership potential in the context of providing solutions and contributing to public benefits. Local engagement in development activities would also contribute to social cohesion and peace, overcoming existing connection gaps and lacking communication.

The Figure **1** is an x-ray diagram of mutual influence of development, peace and conflict. It provides a basic foundation for assessing the impact of development on conflict or peace contexts. The horizontal continuum of peace and conflict is frequently driven by development, as shown by the mutual influence diagram (see Figure **1**). (Mutual Impact cited in NEEDS, 2004). It also demonstrates how conflict and peace dynamics are inextricably linked, as well as current development concerns. As a result, peacebuilding development programming must take into account both ancient and emerging actions in order for the framework to look comprehensive in addressing development concerns. This awareness must be incorporated into all stages of the development program cycle, including planning,

PEACE   ↔   DEVELOPMENT   ↔   CONFLICT

Figure 1: Susceptibility of Peace and Conflict to Development.

Source: Mutual Impact Diagram, (undated).

implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, to ensure that development efforts do not result in an unforeseen catastrophe.

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)

PCIA simply connotes three (3) activities aimed at monitoring, anticipating and evaluating the methods in which intermediation may positively influence the dynamics of peace or conflict in crisis-ravaging zones. This mechanism could be likened to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact which, according to Framojvic and Bush (2004), helps to identify and understand an initiative of peace or conflict in an environment. Apart from its likelihood, PCIA could be widely used for an array of conflict resolution settings. Based on this advantage, PCIA fits into the sequential stages of peace enhancement cycle design, execution and assessment, thus enabling the provision of comprehensive report on peace and conflict initiative in any environment.

Across the globe, PCIA is more of a utility instrument that assists in ascertaining that the adopted peace initiatives do not worsen violent conflict, but rather contribute to peace building within and between communities (NEEDS, 2004). Furthermore, the work of Framojvic and Bush (2004) identified some intrinsic guides for the exercise of PCIA. Just in line with Agwu (2007) and Aning (2008), PCIA is known to be a process which is dynamic and capable of subsisting before, during and after intervention into communal conflict. This instrument commands a localised attribute because the real experts of PCIA are, most often, individuals or groups living in the conflict zones, thereby interplaying their knowledge and experiences in the design and evaluation of peace initiatives. It has been widely argued that if the experts have not been experientially involved in peace and conflict, the PCIA would largely prove abortive (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell & Sitea, 2007).

In a simpler term, it has become understandable that the act of peace building is merely demolishing the structure of communal conflicts and violence (Burgess & Burgess, 2003; Ouellet, 2003). Although, by doing this, peace enhancement is not automatic. Individuals, groups, and association must be strategic in un-building the violent structure and carefully renovate it with peace capacities. Also, the outcome of PCIA appears specific, instead of being general, because it helps to identify factors that could either bring out violence or establish peace in a community at a

particular point in time. Framojvic and Bush (2004) further stressed this position that PCIA's result/outcome is double-sided. It presents the case of peace in dual perspectives - investigating the impact of peace building mechanisms; and, showcasing an effect of the institutions of governance in a given society.

Above all, it is inarguable that the exercise of peace building initiatives largely aims at contributing to peace and unity within, between and among individuals, groups, and communities as the case may be. However, this exercise will not just activate itself. Oladoyin (2001) and Layder (2014) argued that concerted efforts of a number of local actors would rather actualise the genuine and lasting peace, adding that actualisation is not in a jiffy, but time-consuming. At the local level, key areas of PCIA cover social empowerment, political structures and processes, conflict management capacities, militarised violence and human security, as well as economic structures and processes. It therefore becomes substantive that these key areas of PCIA constitute part of the main components of governance at the local level.

In general, the PCIA is used to assess (ex post facto) progress anticipation and interventions of prospective project impact on structures and processes that either consolidate the prospects for peaceful coexistence and reduce the likelihood of violence, or escalate the likelihood of resolving conflict through violent means. Ex-post facto, PCIA gives valid explanations for conflict resurgence, while ex-ante, PCIA predicts likely events that will occur soon but have not yet occurred (NEEDS, 2004; Remi, 2007). The PCIA not only aids in tracking good progress, but also demonstrates the unexpected consequences of development administration on peacebuilding. Peacebuilders might use the second edition of PCIA, which is an all-purpose conflict-sensitive tool, to examine ex-ante the impact of development on conflict and peacebuilding initiatives, and vice versa, with the use of these pre- and post-conflict analyses.

The framework for mainstreaming peacebuilding is reflected in the scenario analysis of PCIA indicators. The conclusions of the scenario analysis in a conflict-sensitive zone permit proactive participation and interference with development activities. The planning process should include the following steps: identifying conflict actors/parties (stakeholder analysis); identifying the objectives and activities; assessing the peace-building environment (situation/causal analysis); and incorporating measurable peace-building variables into

the logical framework for the intervention (Leonhardt, 2000; Lange, 2004; Remi, 2007). The above-mentioned steps must be followed during the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation stages of the program/project intervention to achieve the intended results.

The relevance of cross-examining the conflict-creating and peace-building impacts in a specific community has been highlighted by the PCIA framework. Furthermore, this paradigm went a step further by including peace and conflict concerns into conflict management from the start, ensuring that by focusing on community peace, it also addresses the peace and conflict consequences. This framework underlines, among other things, the important areas of PCIA in context and the mutual influence of peace and conflict (NEEDS, 2004). The paradigm is based on the idea that PCIA has both deliberate and unforeseen effects on the dynamics of peace and conflict in the environments where they operate.

PCIA demonstrated its ability to quantify success in certain peacebuilding efforts using an example of a log frame. The PCIA indicators, most crucially, have been included in this toolkit as a guiding tool for peacebuilding. The framework's users are mostly local actors and stakeholders who may utilize the indicators in the PCIA checklist to address various community concerns that influence critical areas of governance at the local level in order to quickly resolve any disputes that may arise in the development process (Bush, 2003; Oshita, 2005).

The optimisation of peace building opportunities constitutes the major concern of the PCIA as it contributes towards creating a violent-free environment for the realisation of both local and international goals of governance. The framework will enhance the attainment of environmental safety, human rights, freedom, peace, and civic participation in the processes of governance which encompasses the conditions for human security. Both state and non-state actors would be able to make a constructive input to the development processes. Hence, stability, good governance and promotion of peace through community participation in development will most appropriately be the end result.

Overview of Communal Conflicts in Nigeria

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, highly complex, multi-cultural, multi-religious and pluralistic country, with more 250 ethnic groups. (Smith & Robinson, 2001; Danfulani, 2009). When the country is fractured along the lines of culture, language, religion, ethnicity, and regional identity, this pluralistic identity is most typically expressed (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). In contrast to other religious believers, the country's population of approximately 150 million people is mostly made up of Christians and Muslims (Paden, 2008; Schwartz, 2010). Individual intricacies and recursive social and ethnic identities within informal or public sector contexts are the major sources of conflict in Nigeria (Benson & Lamidi, 2018, Lamidi, 2019a).

Since the 1980s, identity conflicts have become a recurring decimal in Nigeria, especially in the country's Northern region (Abdu, 2002, cited in Osaretim & Akov, 2013). The peculiarities of identity conflicts are not mainly restricted to the Northern states. It portends similar occurrence across the communities of the federation, notably in *Jukun/Tiv, Modakeke/Ife, Sabongari/Kano, Urhobo/Itsekiri, Sabo/Ibadan, Zango/Kataf, Hausa/Shagamu* and *Kuteb/Jukun-Chamba* (Danfulani, 2009). Others include: the *Ogoni* Vs *Andom,* and *Chamba* Vs *Kuteb* in Rivers State; *Asipa* Vs *Ipetumodu* in Osun State*; Erin-Ile* Vs *Offa* in Kwara State; the *Tiv* Vs Other ethnic groups in *Azara* of *Nassarawa* State in 2001; the *Sharia* crisis in Kaduna State; the *Geomai* Vs the *Hausa/Fulani* in *Shandan* local government of Plateau State in 2002; the Tarok Vs Hausa/Fulani in Plateau State in 2004; the *Quan* Vs *Pan* in *Quan'pan* Local Government of Plateau State in 2006; the *Hausa/Fulani* and the *Beron, Anaguta* and *Afizare* in Jos North local government in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2010 respectively; "the *Boko Haram* violence that has engulfed *Borno, Yobe, Bauchi* and *Kano* States since July 2009" (Kwaja, 2009; Osaretim & Akov, 2013; Lamidi, 2019c); among other unreported cases of conflicts within the Nigerian public space.

While some scholars argue that communal conflicts are rooted in bad governance, politicization of ethnic and religious identities, and competition and conflict for political power by ethnic and religious communities, others argue that communal conflicts are rooted in bad governance, politicization of ethnic and religious identities, and competition and conflict for political power by ethnic and religious communities, respectively (Cohen, 2003; Machava, 2008). The inauguration of democratic government in Nigeria in 1999 was greeted with cautious hope, but Kwaja (2009:105) claims that "the country has rather experienced a revival in high level ethnic, religious, communal, and citizenship disputes with disastrous

effects." The re-enthronement of democracy in Nigeria since 1999 has not anticipatorily resolved the perennial unrest ravaging most communities for a very long time. Although, one of the broad objectives of democracy is to consolidate peaceful co-existence, social integration, and general well-being. In spite of this democratic benefit, peaceful resolution of identity conflicts are yet to be adequately guaranteed in Nigeria's political and social landscape (Olayode, 2007).

Citizens' inclusion or exclusion politics, on the other hand, are sometimes related to the core causes of ethno-religious and communal disputes in Nigeria. These are intertwined with claims and counterclaims about who is included or excluded from decision-making, as well as access to privileges and opportunities (Kwaja, 2009; Osaretin & Akov, 2013). The state has privately suffered beleaguering implications on this identity conflicts in the areas of leadership selection, project location and social inclusion (Benson & Lamidi, 2018). The far-reaching consequences of identity conflicts, according to Babangida (2002), have been the colossal loss of human and material resources in violence and communal clashes inspired by ethnic and religious sentiments, thereby heightening the threats to the security of life and properties, as well as the fragility of the political process and stable economy.

The main source of identity and communal conflict in Nigeria is that elements of social restructuring appear lacking among groups and communities. This is evident as observed by Osaretin and Akov (2013) that most minority groups have remained permanent minorities, while the majority groups are permanent. This poses serious threats to inter-ethnic and religious relations among the varied religious and ethnic identities in Nigeria. In this manner, it has however become clearer that ethnic cooperation and integration have been undermined thereby the peace building task is more challenging and complex, and thus leaving these multi-ethnic groups in an environment of apathy, mutual distrust, suspicion, and conflict-prone. Instead of resulting in violent conflict, lessons should be drawn from democratic tenets by the marginalised ethnic groups or communities to adopt constitutional and extra-constitutional mechanisms to challenge the hegemony of the major ethnic groups or communities.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of Integrative ties is a legitimate theoretical and practice model of peace building activities. The integrative/cross-cutting ties could also allow for promoting a frame about the conflict involving two rights instead of a right and wrong. As Gamson (1992:67) noted that, "On most political and socio-cultural issues, conflict resolution is best achieved when there is no victor, no vanquish". However, in the events of competing interpretations, the theory suggests the ways of framing information and facts in alternative ways in a symbolic context using two broad alternative attitudes or orientations in managing, handling or resolving conflict: cooperation and assertiveness (Lamidi, 2020; Lamidi, 2021a). Cooperation is indicative of the contending party's desire to simultaneously satisfy his need as well as those of his opponent. While, assertiveness describes the desire to satisfy one's own desires to the exclusion or at the expense of the others (Ojiji, 2007; Lamidi, 2021b). However, this theory eulogizes the former against the latter as it serves as a good tenet for durable and sustainable peace.

Here, such tactics as accommodation, avoidance, collaboration, cooperation and dialogue are the instruments for peace building process. The frame advanced by people-to-people initiatives promotes cooperation and could be seen as working on the resolution of disagreements. This is critical as the way people react is greatly motivated by one's frame/perception. This theory also goes further to accentuate the significance of family ties and cultural tolerance among individuals, groups and communities. Any theory achieving this level of legitimacy deserves consideration from social perspectives with a belief in the value of eclecticism in social behaviour. Furthermore, integrative ties theory should be viewed as particularly significant because of its applicability to all forms of conflicts: micro, mezzo, and macro.

Peace Building Strategies among the Three Major Ethnic Groups in Nigeria

These respective ethnic groups are clearly distinctive from one another on many social issues, including justice system or building peace among their people. However, in their traditional settings, scholars have identified internal mechanisms put in place by the traditional chiefs for the resolution of conflicts in varied dimensions between and among people or communities (Bagudu, 2004; Asiyanbola, 2007; Olayiwola & Okorie, 2010; MacGinty, 2013; Olaleye, 2016; Lamidi, 2019a). With this giant stride, a great sense of peace building was obtainable in the traditional settings among the three major ethnic

groups in Nigeria. This is indeed an inch-advantage ahead of the modern justice system.

Ajayi and Buhari (2014) conceptualised the mostly used resolution techniques by these ethnic groups. These include cross-examination, mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, and adjudication. Moreover, truth and confidence also represent two significant factors in the application of these resolution techniques. There is no strong deviation between these techniques and the modern peace building strategies. This is thus an indication that peace building strategies are not alien to conflict resolution in Nigeria. The new phase of peace building strategies in Nigeria employs extra-judicial methods and the use of legal maxims to persuade and convince the individual or group disputants about the implications.

Peace Building Strategies in *Yoruba* Ethnic Group

Among *Yoruba* ethnic group, their indigenous laws, norms, and regulations are based on customs and traditions. Because traditional maxims are primarily unwritten, literacy levels in this area of African societies were linked to verbal arts, historical precedents, and traditional performances (Adam, 2000; Kotze, 2000). As a result, the Yoruba land arbitration system is based on traditional knowledge and wisdom as demonstrated by their forefathers. Community organizations are formed and tasked with maintaining peace and order in the marketplace and among the age groups, as well as resolving land disputes, chieftaincy issues, and other social issues.

In *Yoruba* ethnic group, the tactics for peacebuilding focus on the people's noteworthy social encounters. At the family level, this is the smallest unit of a community, known in Yoruba as Idile, and the family's head is known as Bale. Bale resolves the matters that arise at this level, which may include disputes between sons and daughters, co-wives, and battles between his dependents and their neighbors (Oguntomisin, 2004; Nwolise, 2005). The informal technique here is that the Bale appeases the disputants and seeks endorsement of his pacific method of dispute settlement. However, the Bale would still provide a warning to his children to avoid any potentially dangerous behavior.

The extended family, on the second level, is made up of many families linked by blood relationships. In Yoruba, the extended family is referred to as Ebi, while the head of the extended family is referred to as Mojagi. At this level, a prominent peace-building method appears to handle major concerns such as inheritance and any case that affects the extended family's livelihood, marital infidelity, property disputes, and control of the connection between family members and outsiders.

In Yoruba, the third level of societal strata is known as Adugbo, and it consists of several family compounds led by Baale. Conflicts are treated as civil cases at this point. The ward-court, chief's popularly known as Ile-ejo ijoye Adugbo, is in charge of the peace-building procedures (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). Although this committee cannot rule on criminal charges, it is frequently tasked with conducting preliminary inquiries into civil disputes before referring them to the customary courts.

Towns and cities in Yoruba land have coordinated structures for peace promotion at the highest level. This is the exclusive responsibility of the Chief-in-Council, also known as Igbimo Ilu in Yoruba. This Chief-in-Council was considered as the highest court, where "appeals might be filed, but, particularly in Egba and Ijebu, the Ogboni court was the last court of appeal" (Oguntomisin, 2004:11). Despite the strategic planning of peace-building initiatives at all levels of society, the modern quest for peace does not use the conventional enlisted mechanism for peace-building; rather, justice is sought through the adjudicative means given to the country upon independence (Albert, 2001; Olaoba, 2005; Ajayi & Buahri, 2014; Lamidi, 2019b). Unlike the inherited colonial resolution system, the indigenous system does not award fines for damages to disputants. More specifically, the colonial judicial system aims to determine who is to blame between or among the disputing parties. Instead, local mediators are particularly concerned with resolving civil matters peacefully and restoring peace between or among fighting groups or communities. This is the essence of the peace-building process.

Peace Building Strategies in *Igbo* Ethnic Group

The family, Amala (council of elders), Okpara system (eldest male), Umuanna (clan), Umuada (female born in a town but married out), assembly of the people, age grades, Ohanaeze (assembly of the people and the king), hunters' association, and Agbara are among the Igbo traditional institutions for peacebuilding (local deities or oracles). These are similar to those seen in other African traditional communities (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). Before colonial adventurism in Nigeria, the *Igbo* ethnic group

comprised more than two hundred autonomous villages with internal organisations which rest upon patrilineal lineages. This ethnic group has no central traditional reconciliatory system, each autonomous village has its respective styles and patterns.

This section utilizes conventional procedures for resolving the Umurebo-Umokuzu and Umuleri-Aguleri land conflicts in this case. The plot of land, known as ala ihu okpaula or ala mkpoku, is situated between the warring Umenebo and Umuokuzu clans of Obokwu village in Obinze, which is now part of Imo State's Owerri West local government area. Several attempts at peace and reconciliation have been made in relation to this land conflict. According to Ojiji (2007), the elders of Obokwu village engaged in multiple third-party mediation initiatives as part of their peace-building strategy. This resolution mechanism did not only involve the traditional chiefs; but the peace enhancement process also involved other indigenous groups, such as *Nwanwa* group (men and women whose mothers were born at *Obokwu* village) as well as *Umuada.* There was also a strong respect for the constituted authority of their respective clans, thus enabling the strict adherence to sound warnings from their Chief priests before, during and after the crisis. This, in turn, allows for peaceful reconciliation process and all-inclusive local methods of peace building.

On the other hand, there is a pathetic dimension to the conflict between *Umuleri* and *Aguleri.* This was due to the fact that the members of the two groups have a common ancestor from Eri and had peacefully coexisted in Otuocha for decades prior to the outbreak of division and chaos. Before the conventional technique was used to resolve land conflicts, state-based strategies failed to provide satisfying solutions to both warring parties (Nwolise, 2005). The customary technique for ending the Aguleri-Umuleri-Umuoba Annam battle amicably included oath-taking, a proclamation of "No more war/peace treaty," and the execution of a cleaning rite known as Ikomue. Only Aguleri and Umuleri were present for the first oath, which was taken on January 25, 2000. In order to prevent the growth of land conflicts and human destabilization in the Omambala region, other neighboring towns later banded together. For the oath-taking activities, these surrounding villages presented their local deities and leaders (Ajayi & Buahri, 2014). This helped to explain how traditional religious beliefs may occasionally aid in the resolution of disagreements and dispute situations.

Finally, when it comes to Igbo traditional institutions, one cannot help but agree that the two case studies examined, Umunebo-Umnokugu and Aguleri-Umuleri, gave clear proof of the ongoing usefulness of both traditional means and other punishments for peacebuilding. When the Christians in these communities were urged to swear in accordance with Christianity teaching, led by the respective priests of the Catholics and Anglicans with their Bibles, an import from orthodox views was clear. Each religion chose a representative to take the oath on behalf of the rest of the congregation. Cohabitation and peaceful coexistence would have been extremely difficult for members of these cultures if sacrifice had not been made. In the Eri kingdom, it is also believed that the spirits of those murdered in the fight will seek retribution on those who dine with their killers. Peace was restored, real reconciliation began, and social harmony was restored among these communities from that day forward (Nwolise, 2005).

Peace Building Strategies in *Hausa* Ethnic Group

Extant literature has discussed that the traditional rulers in this ethnic group had a centralised administrative structure with full authority over their people. Although the interests of the subjects dictate the governance space with well-defined hierarchies through their councillors, including district heads and village heads. Emirs of the notable Northern Kingdoms functioned as both religious and administrative leaders; judiciary matters became the responsibility of traditional rulers in their domains, and they led their people to war (Bobboyi & Yakubu, 2005). In spite of these overwhelming powers, traditional rulers were not dictators; rather, there was adequate consultation with their councillors and other officials on every policy decisions and political actions. This, however, transcends to the current political system.

The peace building strategies of this ethnic group did not start at this period; rather, the group had a long history of social conflicts predating the Nigerian independence in 1960. This section seems not to border on the number of resolution mechanism employed by Emirate traditional council in the ethnic group. A key reason is that the centralised structure of the Emirate council facilitated quick and responsive resolution mechanisms in all the emirates with high respect for the traditional hierarchies. Moreso, on the side of the conflicting groups, there seems to be high respect and public legitimacy for the emirate constituted authority (Blench *et al*. 2006). These

attributes could be said to have made it convenient for conflict resolution and peace enhancement in the region. To this end, the reduction in communal violence in the North has shallow roots in the organic structure of the ethnic group. This is an indication that a centralised and hierarchical governance structure engenders somewhat effective prevention of conflict and its re-insurgence.

It wasn't until 2009, when Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group, took over vast portions of Maiduguri before forcefully fighting the police, that the state's security infrastructure was exposed. According to sources, state security organizations had repeatedly notified their superiors of the impending threat (Africa Report No. 168, 2010). Properly community and security policies are needed to better handle and, more critically, prevent this terrorism. The vast majority of religious and civil society groups in the community need to be pushed out of their comfort zones (Rabasa *et al*. 2010). The extremist and violent edges of this group will require a mix of stronger information and advanced deradicalization methods at the security level. Boko Haram militants are seeking asylum in neighboring countries, thus intelligence should be closely coordinated with them. They must demonstrate their willingness to engage in discourse with persons who are averse to interacting with government officials. While direct discussion with the small extremist fringe may not be viable, a far more inclusive discourse is required to diminish the recruiting pool.

Specific Focus on Peacebuilding Strategies in Conflict-Spot of Kaduna Communities

This section provides specific focus on strategies of peace building in Nigeria's development space with special attention on conflict-spot communities in Kaduna State. The reason for interrogation of the peace building strategies is owing to the evident-based; and there are series of conflict events with corresponding peace building strategies across the communities in the State. The conflict events have undergone series of peace building strategies. SBM Intel (2017) provided a critical investigation on the Southern Kaduna. The report traced the conflict origin to 1981 when there was a dispute between *Adara* residents and *Hausa* traders on property rights. The resolution of this dispute was strategized with the tool of mediation between the conflicting parties, taking cognizance of the economic interests of the two opposing sides (Olayoku, 2017). Historic insights were brought forth by the residents with stiff resistance by

the *Hausa* traders at the first instance. This is always experienced in every peace building exercise. Upon mediation process, each group was meant to understand the realities, thereby at the long-run acknowledging the need for adjustments in demand by the two parties. A good peace building strategy here is mediation which brought out acceptable realities for the warring parties.

In 1986, there was a contest on the candidature of district head of *Lere* community in Kaduna. The conflict has a religion undertone. It broke out when some indigenes opposed the chosen leader due to his religion base. The situation was also amplified by post-election violence (Bobboyi & Yakubu, 2005). In resolving all of these, the religious sentiments were downplayed; and it was argued that religion is not a bureaucratic or administrative factor for selecting who should emerge as leaders. However, the conflicts remain as pointer to the inherent hatred and enmity between the residing Christians and Muslims especially across Kaduna communities. Peace reconciliatory efforts were anchored by Inter-religious committee set up by the government with a view to disenchanting religious interest in governance system.

More intensive is the 1992 crisis in *Zangon Kataf* community in Kaduna State. The conflict recorded large number of fatalities when compared to the previous ones (Akinteye *et al*. 2001). Olayoku (2017) gave a good account on the crisis and the peace modalties. This conflict was largely driven by ethnic differences between the *Hausa* and the *Atyap* of the *Zangon Kataf*. The conflict was sparked by misunderstanding issues on market relocation between the two disputing groups (Suberu, 1996; Kazah-Toure, 2003). Despite the intensity of the conflict, the mutual identification of the conflict source was a notable strategy of peace building in the resolution of the crisis. This strategy was deployed by the Reconciliatory committee which uprooted the causes from the pre-colonial incidences to the current post-independence era. There was a strong de-emphasis on the indigene/settler context in the community so as to have a clearer understanding of the crisis history and dynamics. This was acclaimed to be fundamental in managing age-long inter-ethnic conflict between the belligerent groups and restoring social harmony for community development agenda.

Six years later, in 1998, there was ethno-religious confrontations in Kaduna communities with *Kafanchan* community recording high rate of fatalities.

Manipulation of difference was exploited by the state, mainly for political gains. For instance, Awe (1999) traced the reasons for deep-rooted confrontations on the basis of ethnicity and religions across the communities in Kaduna State. It was affirmed that there was a paradigm shift from inclusive accommodating culture to ethno-religious discrimination on political and socio-economic spectra. This confrontation posed big threat to the State towards the reign of new democratic regime and the commencement of the Nigerian fourth republic. Strategic efforts were however made to deradicalise the aggrieved parties. They were also asked to present a common font for the community development, while individual groups were enjoined to take reconciliatory responsibility at their respective ends. Nevertheless, the ethno-religious tendency still transcends in the socio-political order of most Kaduna communities. Furthermore, Stewart (2009) queried why the ethno-religious character still subsists in the Nigeria's development space. It was maintained that the character is a tool of political calculus, considerable factor in the political games and gimmicks, and a social instrument used for hunting down rivals in order to attain political power, especially as evident in Southern Kaduna. It is important to state here that there is still need for constant orientation as a peace building strategy for playing less of ethno-religious politics at the detriment of development agenda.

In 2000, there was also a wide protest against the envisaged introduction of the *Sharia* law by the State. The protest, in a way, was largely championed by those whose faiths have no connection with *Sharia* principles. This resulted into destructive violence in *Fadan Kogoma* and *Gwantu* among other communities in Kaduna State (Ibeanu, 2000; Wilkes & Okamoto, 2002). The violence was however resolved using the State judicial apparatus. It was realised that the ethnic composition across the Kaduna communities made the introduction of the *Sharia* law not to enjoy popular acceptance. Peace building stresses the need for interrelatedness and interdependence of constituent individuals and groups so that the resolution strategies can strive irrespective of the socio-political and ethno-religious differences.

In 2002, a host of social event, *Miss World Beauty Pageant,* was protested against by Muslim faithfuls in the Northern Nigeria. It was infamously reported that the protest led to violence in some Kaduna communities. There was no relationship between the communities and the organization of social event. It indicated the volatility of the communities to issues that are less conflict concerned (Salawu, 2010). A quick resolute is that there is significant need for the management of hostile relationship among the prone ethno-religious divisions in the communities. Such that, any available misconception would not always be used to orchestrate unwarranted fatal violence. In this regard, there are numerous peace advocacy committees established by the state or non-state actors with a view to ensuring peaceful co-habitations among volatile individuals and groups across conflict-prone Kaduna communities.

Going forward in 2010, there was a spot of political dimension in the trend of conflict within the Kaduna communities. SBM Intel (2017) reported that there was an outbreak of politically motivated violence in Kaduna communities, leading to the burning of *Kafanchan* market as well as residential and religious buildings. This violence was driven by the campaign wake of the 2011 General elections in Nigeria. More worsening is that there are still reported cases of ethno-religious clashes in this same year. This led to militarization of the conflict zones within the Kaduna communities. This therefore underlines military enforcement as a peace building strategy in Nigeria's development space, mainly with the purpose of engendering discontinuation of violence and peace resolution.

In 2016, till the period of this publication, there has been a shift in the crisis nature, types and patterns in Kaduna communities. This shift was noticeable in the current Southern Kaduna crisis. It became evident because the crisis was no longer the localized and driven by the historic and ethno-religious bases. The crisis, according to SBM Intel (2017:3), was "a clear retribution over lost cattle and for grazing land by the *Fulani*". It was also discerned to be more of external aggression by *Fulani* herdsmen who are traceable to neighbouring West African countries. This introduced complexities to the conflict situation in Kaduna communities. The response to this situation has been a dual-task approach to peace building; which firstly geared towards uniting the age-long rivalry among the locals; and built a strong defence with State support against external aggression by *Fulani* herdsmen.

CONCLUSION

Studies on peace building in Nigeria have most often argued in favour of the capability of peace building strategies at taming the risk of violent conflict. Although, up till date, peace building still remains an enormous challenge for Nigeria with a low human

development index and civic orientations. However, PCIA is a major utility instrument used across the globe with a view to ascertaining that the adopted peace initiatives do not worsen violent conflict, rather contribute to peace building at all strata for the assessment (*ex post facto*) of progress interventions and anticipation (*ex ante*) of the impact of prospective actions aimed at subduing the possibility of violence. It is also recommended the instrumentality of PCIA should take cognisance of blending the evident strategies across tribes in Nigeria especially the highlighted strategies of peace building across the Kaduna communities.

Furthermore, the examination of peace building strategies in the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria revealed that there were internal mechanisms put in place by their traditional institutions for the resolution of conflicts. A common feature of the peace building strategies in the trio is that it does not only aim at delivering justice, but also goes further to ensure that the delivered justice enhances peaceful co-existence scenes.

From the analysis of Kaduna communities, this paper identified some notable peace building strategies which are either relatively obtainable or utilisable in other communities within the Nigeria social context and beyond. At first, mediation is the mostly deplored strategy of peace building across communities in Kaduna and Nigeria at large. The second is the peace reconciliatory efforts which are usually instituted in post-conflict environments, as exemplified across the conflict zones within the Kaduna communities. Mutual identification of the conflict source was the third notable strategy of peace building which aims at tracing the root causes of conflict tragedy. At fourth, constant orientation and deradicalisation of conflicting parties are identified as peace building strategy for the development agenda of any warring zones in Nigeria and beyond. The fifth strategy stresses the social need for interrelatedness and interdependence of individuals and groups across cultures. In the case of intractable element of political dimension and conflict proliferation, military enforcement is underlined as the strategy of peace building noticeable in the Nigeria's development space. Also, the dual-task approach to peace building is highly emphasized for retributive conflicts arising from external aggression.

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