

A Decade of Liberal Cosmopolitanism in the United States: The Effects of Gender, Race, and Income

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Abstract: This study investigates correlates of cosmopolitan sentiments in the United States over a decade, contributing to the literature in two ways. First, it tests the “group status thesis” in the U.S., which suggests that marginalized and disadvantaged groups are more likely to exhibit cosmopolitan attitudes. Second, it examines the interaction between socioeconomic factors and the waves of the World Values Survey conducted between 2006 and 2017. The findings support the main hypotheses of the group status thesis: women, non-Whites, and lower-income individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan in their outlook. Over the 11-year period, the gap in liberal cosmopolitanism between genders and income levels widened. The study concludes that liberal cosmopolitanism is rooted in specific structural locations, with marginalized groups being more inclined to embrace it. Notably, support for cosmopolitanism remained relatively strong before and during the early years of the Trump administration in 2017.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, group status thesis, inclusive society, repeated cross-sectional data, gender and race.

The new millennium witnessed a rise of economic globalization promoted by the US since the late 1940s (Aggarwal 2016), which, compounded by the fast development of instant and mobile communication, began to erode the political independence of nation-states, a hallmark of industrialization since the Enlightenment. Americans were exposed to progressively more diversified new waves of immigrants, and the idea of cosmopolitanism returned to the academic front (Cao *et al.* 2024; Delanty and He 2008; Nussbaum and Cohen 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2009), advancing from the 1990s’ theoretical elaboration to the new millennium’s empirical stage (Bayram 2019; Phillips and Smith 2008).

Cosmopolitanism is a vast topic (Roudometof 2005), and our aim in this study is relatively limited. We are probing a version of cosmopolitanism with a focus on tolerance, trusting different people, and lack of nationalism, in which the value shift happens “from within” (Cao *et al.* 2024). Otherwise stated, we investigate the correlates of *liberal cosmopolitanism* in the contemporary USA. Note that we are not interested in globalization, defined as the increase in the exchange of goods, capital, labor, and information across nations, as something taking place “out there” (Beck and Sznaider 2006, p. 9).

Cosmopolitanism as a research topic among academics has been understudied. Most published works have been cross-sectional, and the measures used are inconsistent, missing the core idea of

cosmopolitanism. In addition, there is little explanation of why gender and race/ethnicity are important in the study of cosmopolitanism. A better understanding of cosmopolitanism and its associates is pivotal in appreciating the public mood and in counterattacking the negative aspects of right-wing ideology, self-isolationism, and anti-immigration emotions. This study, therefore, contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we applied “group status thesis” (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967) in explaining the variance in liberal cosmopolitanism in the USA. This hypothesis has not been rigorously tested in multiple regression analyses with data from the USA. There have been conflicting theses on how socioeconomic factors may influence cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, some scholars (Ossewaarde 2007; Wallerstein 1996) argue that cosmopolitanism is intrinsically elite among academics and disproportionately common in economically or culturally privileged sectors and societies. On the other hand, Gorman and Seguin (2018) posit that marginalized and neglected groups within society tend to express more global identification. Their international data support their proposition. We extend their insight to explain American cosmopolitanism.

Second, we investigate the correlates of a new measure of liberal cosmopolitanism proposed by Cao *et al.* (2024), and third, we explore the interactional effects of socioeconomic factors and survey waves of World Values Surveys (hereafter WVS) over a decade between 2006-2017. The overwhelming majority of research on cosmopolitanism relies on cross-sectional data and cross-national comparisons. While they can provide a useful snapshot at a one-time point, stacked time-series cross-sectional data are more robust and

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capable of revealing long-term trends in value shifts (Cao *et al.* 2024; Norris and Inglehart 2009; Zhao and Cao 2010).

RESEARCH ON COSMOPOLITANISM IN THE WORLD AND THE USA

The study of cosmopolitanism is important as there has been an alarmingly escalating political polarization in the United States before and during the Trump administration (2017-2021) (Ziv *et al.* 2019), a partial consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 (Hochschild 2018; Kalleberg 2011). The idea of cosmopolitanism originated in the work of the Stoics and Cynics (Delanty and He 2008). It can also be found in Confucian political philosophy in East Asia (see Pichler 2009: 706). In both cases, it refers to the general idea that individuals belong to the world community instead of the local community or geolocation where they were born and raised. The spread of cosmopolitanism was associated with expanding capitalism from Europe with philosophers such as Kant, connecting cosmopolitanism with a universalistic orientation to the world community (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997). For Kant, it represented a demand to recognize universal rights and humanity, a big and vague projection. At the minimum, cosmopolitanism seeks to encompass all humans in the whole world. One attraction of cosmopolitanism for liberal-minded social scientists is its normative orientation, relevant to transnationalism and the growing consciousness of globality (Merton 1964). It is also consistent, in spirit, with the sociological and criminological imagination of an inclusive and supportive society (Cao 2022; Cullen 1994; Young 2011).

Cosmopolitanism ideal and national sovereignty are intertwined in sociological and political studies. In a nutshell, the concept of nationalism involves two types: liberal and illiberal nationalism (Brown 1999). Illiberal nationalism is a primordial, exclusivist, and cultural ideology of blood and soil whereas liberal nationalism is an inclusivist ideology built around political ideas of citizenship and human rights. We believe that cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not the opposite poles of a continuum (Bayram 2019; Nassbaum 2002). Instead, they are best seen “as complex incarnations of universalistic ideas of openness, inclusivity, and self-determination on the one hand, and particularistic notions of competitive states and mutually exclusive identities, on the other” (Chernilo 2020, p. 1080).

Our curiosity was piqued by the increasing political polarization in the USA since the Trump phenomenon

swept the USA (Ziv *et al.* 2019). Despite the long-time protestations of American tolerance and open-mindedness, there was a surge of extreme tendencies on both the political left and right after the 2008 financial crisis (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Liu and Trefler 2019). The frustrated groups, including the middle and lower classes, were hit hard by the crisis and they shifted away from liberal-progressive values and embraced more conservative attitudes on various issues (Hochschild 2018). The Rust Belt working class demanded protection from globalization; activists in the Occupy movement urged a heavy redistributive tax on the rich; conservatives in rural areas enthusiastically mobilized anti-immigrant campaigns.

Given the fracturing of society, understanding how Americans view cosmopolitanism and whether their views are rooted in a particular structural location has become increasingly important. In what follows, we take a close look at the empirical research on American public mood regarding cosmopolitanism over a decade. We attempt to answer the following questions: How do sociodemographic factors, especially gender, race, and income, influence cosmopolitanism in the USA? And was there a shifting gap in cosmopolitanism between these social groups in a decade? We rely on an index of liberal cosmopolitanism constructed by Cao *et al.* (2024) with three US samples from the WVS data (2006-2017) to answer these two questions. We also explore the interaction effects between socio-economic factors and survey year.

Cosmopolitanism postulates that all individuals belong to a single world community regardless of georigins and social, racial, or religious identities. The notion of cosmopolitanism is multi-dimensional by its very nature (Pichler 2009). From a psychological perspective, well-socialized adults can care about all humanity instead of caring about in-groups only. According to human emancipation theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013), people growing up in an affluent and secure environment are more likely to be open-minded, trustful, tolerant, and liberal on various social issues, such as immigration, environmental protection, and sexual minorities, and to prefer cosmopolitanism over nationalism (Inglehart 2020). Previous studies indicate that cosmopolitanism may include the following aspects: (1) an idea of unity beyond national identities; (2) a belief that ethnic/racial, cultural, and religious diversities can enrich one's well-being; and (3) a call for more global governance over issues like gender equality (Pichler 2009; 2011). Admittedly, this understanding of cosmopolitanism

overlaps with the measure of liberalism (see Cao and Selman 2010). Indeed, the measure of liberalism taps the underlying concept of tolerance of various domestic policies, such as divorce, homosexuality, suicide, etc. In contrast, the measure of liberal cosmopolitanism we use here captures the underlying concept of tolerance *beyond the national border*.

Americans' preferences for cosmopolitan values are more nuanced and complex (Furia 2005; Stack *et al.* 2010; Zhao and Cao 2010). Empirical studies have focused on where the USA stands relative to the rest of the world (Phillips and Smith, 2008; Pichler, 2011; Schueth and O'Loughlin 2008), but little work has exclusively considered the factors associated with American cosmopolitanism. This issue of American cosmopolitanism is important because it sets the stage for future-oriented policy initiatives. If Americans are internally oriented, this gives room for more right-wing ideology, more self-isolationism, and more anti-immigration emotion. But if Americans intend to continue to lead the world, the support for cosmopolitanism needs to be revived by nurturing the growth of social liberalism (Cao and Selman 2010; Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Ziv *et al.* 2019), which overlaps with cosmopolitanism (Bayram 2015; Pichler 2011). This article attempts to answer how one's structural locations, such as gender and race, are related to cosmopolitanism.

Measuring and Explaining Cosmopolitanism

Most empirical work on cosmopolitanism compares data across nations (Bayram 2015; Furia 2005; Gorman and Seguin 2018; Gorman and Seguin 2020; Jung 2008; Phillips and Smith 2008; Pichler 2009; 2011; Schueth and O'Loughlin 2008; Zhou 2016). Using data from the fifth wave of the WVS (2005-2008), Bayram (2015) measured *cosmopolitan allegiance* using a single item with three ordinal categories of strongly agree, agree, and disagree in response to the statement "I see myself as a citizen of the world." Results from the multinomial logit model suggested that cosmopolitanism was related to a series of ideas, such as universalism, benevolence, hedonism, achievement, conformity, religiosity, and urbanism. Participants with higher incomes were more likely to see themselves as world citizens, whereas the effects of gender and education were insignificant in their comprehensive model.

Selecting 21 countries from the third wave (1995-1997) of the WVS, Schueth and O'Loughlin (2008)

created a measure of cosmopolitanism as a binary by combining two items of belonging to "the world as a whole" as one and all other categories as 0. Immigration, patriotism, activism, and environmentalism were significant predictors of cosmopolitanism. The effect of education was positively related to cosmopolitanism, and age was negatively associated. Similarly, Bayram's (2015) and Schueth and O'Loughlin's (2008) studies capture *cosmopolitan identity* or feelings of belonging to the world as a whole (the belonging to the geolocation) as the measure of cosmopolitanism.

Focusing on the relationship between *cosmopolitan practices* and *cosmopolitan beliefs*, Phillips and Smith (2008: 392) looked at cosmopolitan "on the ground" as actions and attitudes. They found cosmopolitan practices in Australia increased cosmopolitan outlooks. Their measure of cosmopolitanism captured only the emotions of everyday cultural differences that have resulted from global immigration and the emergence of the residential ethnoscape. They found younger, better educated were more receptive to the presence of the Other. The effects of gender, race, and income were insignificant. Their measure of cosmopolitan outlook missed the core ideas of tolerance and trust of others.

A more sophisticated measure of cosmopolitanism was created by Pichler (2009; 2011). Drawing on data from the European Values Study (1999-2000), Pichler (2009) created a measure of *cosmopolitan orientations* with nine items, centering on attitudes towards immigration, characteristics of neighbors, and the degree of concern about humanity, with an emphasis on foreigners. The hierarchical linear model found females and those with higher income and the better educated had a more cosmopolitan orientation. The age effect was negative. At the country level, GDP was positively related to cosmopolitanism. In another study, Pichler (2011) experimented with multi-dimensional cosmopolitan orientations, looking at ethical and political dimensions. Pichler's fixed effects hierarchical regression models found that the elders, males, less educated, and lower-income groups are less cosmopolitan.

Jung (2008) provided one of the rare time-series data analyses of cosmopolitan and supranational identities from 1981 to 2001. Although he found that the younger generations are more supranational. His ordered logit estimates from the 17-country sample in the WVS show that males and the better educated are more likely to take on supranational identities than women and are less educated. He concluded that

cosmopolitan attitudes and supranational identities did not increase during the temporal scope of the study. Another time-series data analyses (1980-2004) of cosmopolitan identity by Norris and Inglehart (2009) suggest that cosmopolitan identity is positively related to giving priority to reducing poverty in the world and to favorable views on ethnic diversity, and it is negatively associated with imposing strict limits on foreign workers.

One multi-dimensional measure of cosmopolitanism was proposed by Zhou (2016), who attempted to gauge individuals' self-identification with nation-states. The measure was constructed using two items: (1) "How strongly do you agree or disagree that 'I see myself as a world citizen?'" (2) "How strongly do you agree or disagree that 'I see myself as part of the nation?'" A higher score indicated a greater degree of *global self-identification*. It is found that gender and income were insignificant in the multilevel models; age was negatively and education was positively related to global self-identification. None of the country-level factors was significant.

Few have tested competing hypotheses in the study of cosmopolitanism. Furia's study (2005) is one exception. Relying on WVS data of 2002 with 70 plus countries and 76 000 respondents, Furia found that education is positively and income is negatively associated with *moral cosmopolitanism*, which is a single item tapping respondents' allegiance of belonging to the world as well as political cosmopolitanism. Using a smaller USA dataset of the 2004 Inter-university Survey on Allegiance (N=732), he further reported that education is not significant while people with lower income and non-Caucasians are more supportive of universalism and multinationalism. These results provide evidence for his arguments that cosmopolitanism was not systematically more likely to appeal to privileged individuals or societies. The study, however, made no attempts to explain why these groups are less supportive of cosmopolitanism.

The more relevant study to the current research was produced by Gorman and Seguin (2018). Contrary to the conventional thinking (Ossewaarde 2007; Wallerstein, 1996) that cosmopolitanism should be positively associated with the elite, Gorman and Seguin (2018), built on Blumer's (1958) and Blalock's (1967) group status thesis, which posits that racial attitudes reflect not merely individual feelings and beliefs but also a collective "sense of group position," theorize that insecurity and threat experienced by members of

marginalized groups and people on the periphery of the global system as a result of repressive states prompt these people to search for reliable allies internationally, potentially resulting in stronger pro-global identities in the process. Gorman and Seguin (2018) used Roma in Europe and Berbers in North Africa as neglected groups and Kurds in Turkey and Chechens in Russia as marginalized groups to test their hypotheses. Their results show that both neglected and marginalized groups are statistically significantly more pro-global than the more dominant and powerful groups. The effect of age is significant, with older people being more likely to identify with the global identity. Their recent study (Gorman and Seguin 2020), tapping the concept of *global cooperation*, shows that cooperative internationalist attitudes are no more common in the global core than on the periphery, and the elites are more likely to hold pro-global attitudes than non-elite only in wealthy core countries.

Last but not least, Cao *et al.* (2024) proposed a measure of *liberal cosmopolitanism* that focuses on humanity as a whole, and it is inseparable from one's race, nationality, or religion. The measure contains three key aspects of cosmopolitanism: tolerance, trust in people with different religions and nationalities, and lack of national preoccupation. Cao *et al.* found that overall support for cosmopolitanism has been steadily increasing in the US from 1982 to 2017 and that the age-related differences in support for cosmopolitanism became wider over the last four decades.

This literature review reveals several insights. First, the idea of cosmopolitanism is an umbrella term and its measures are quite diverse. Various aspects of cosmopolitanism have been captured by researchers, such as cosmopolitan allegiance (Bayram 2015; Furia 2005), cosmopolitan identity (Gorman and Seguin 2018; Schueth and O'Loughlin 2008), moral cosmopolitanism (Furia 2005), political cosmopolitanism (Furia 2005; Pichler 2011), cosmopolitan practices and beliefs (Phillips and Smith 2008), ethical cosmopolitanism (Picher 2011), cosmopolitan orientation (Pichler 2009; 2011), global self-identification (Jung 2005; Zhou 2016), global cooperative attitudes (Gorman and Seguin 2020), and *liberal cosmopolitanism* (Cao *et al.* 2024). In this study, we adopted Cao *et al.*'s measure.

Second, the effect of race was only tested twice within a single nation: once with Australian data (Phillips and Smith 2008), and it was insignificant; and the other time with American data where it showed that

Caucasians were significantly less cosmopolitan than non-Caucasians (Furia 2005). No studies have tested gender and race as marginalized or neglected groups and their relationship with cosmopolitanism. We attempt to test the group status hypothesis that women and racial minorities in the U.S., who have been systematically excluded from state protections, are more cosmopolitan. Building on Du Bois and Alexander's (1903) prophecy more than a century ago, Cao and Wu (2019, p. 5) found that "the deepest fault line in the US remains between races at the present time." Racial minorities and females are also more likely to seek security internationally in the face of threat and insecurity. Historical evidence supports the hypothesis. Disappointed by the racial injustice in the USA, Sociologist Du Bois visited the People's Republic of China twice in his late life in 1959 and 1962 respectively (Bell, 2014), appealing to Chinese authority for Asian-African solidarity. Similarly, the women's liberation movement originated in Europe, overflowing into the USA (MacKinnon 1982). Therefore, racial minorities and women in the USA are likely to support cosmopolitan values more than their counterparts. Other socio-economic factors (education and income) have quite mixed results (Bayram 2015; Furia 2005; Gorman and Seguin 2018; Pichler 2009; 2011; Zhou 2016). In this study, we center our research attention on race/ethnicity and gender.

Third, the extant studies are largely cross-sectional, and few explore the longitudinal changes within a nation. While insightful, such data tend to fluctuate, as all cross-sectional surveys are time-dependent and time-sensitive (Cao *et al.* 2024; Jung 2008). Indeed, over time, public sentiments about many issues, such as gender roles and immigration, would shift (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018). Time-series cross-sectional data are more reliable and can smooth out fluctuations in public mood over time. Not only could they allow us to estimate the stability of cosmopolitan values over time, but also permit us to test their interactional effects. Accordingly, we use the stacked time-series cross-sectional datasets of WVS from 2006 to 2017.

Research Hypotheses

The current study uses the new multi-dimensional measure of *liberal cosmopolitanism* to clarify American cosmopolitan sentiments over a decade and identify the sources of liberal cosmopolitanism in the USA. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The support for liberal cosmopolitanism in the USA differs by gender, race, and income groups.

Females, non-whites, and low-income groups are more cosmopolitan than their counterparts because they are the marginalized and/or neglected groups in the US.

Hypothesis 2: The gap in support for liberal cosmopolitanism between genders and income groups increased significantly between 2006 and 2017.

METHODS

USA Data (2006-2017) from the WVS Wave 5-7

The data used in this study come from the latest three waves of the WVS project (Wave 5-7 between 2006 and 2017); our analysis employs the American samples only, as they contain the variables of interest, such as trust in people of different nationalities and tolerance of neighbors who speak different languages. Furthermore, the variables we employed from the WVS questions remain consistent across the three selected waves, thus allowing a longitudinal analysis of changes in values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Zhang *et al.* 2009). The WVS project is one of the largest international survey programs. In each country, including the USA, the WVS team collects representative samples. The three US samples were collected by the University of Michigan and followed a detailed methodology to ensure a nationally representative sample (see Inglehart *et al.* 2022 for details).

Dependent Variable: The Construction of Cosmopolitan Index

The dependent variable "liberal cosmopolitanism" was an index of eight items, first constructed by Cao *et al.* (2024). The index combines measurements of the following: tolerance (acceptance of other races, immigrants, speakers of other languages, and people of different beliefs as neighbors); trusting people from different beliefs and nationalities; and weak national preoccupations (willingness to fight for one's own country and feeling of national pride). The above value orientations point to a more open-minded, tolerant, and cosmopolitan direction. A detailed coding scheme can be found in Table 1.

Confirmatory factor analysis indicated the sufficiency of a single index representing all items, and Cronbach's alpha of the eight items reaches 0.65, an acceptable level of cross-item reliability. The items were standardized, taking the averages, and rescaling into a 0 to 10 scale as our cosmopolitanism index. The newly constructed index has a close-to-normal

Table 1: Coding Scheme for Items in the Liberal Cosmopolitanism Index

Items	Variables	Coding	Mean (SD)
Tolerance	"Do you mind people of other races as your neighbor?"	Yes=1 No=10	9.64 (1.76)
	"Do you mind immigrants as your neighbor?"	Yes=1 No=10	8.96 (2.88)
	"Do you mind people who speak different languages as your neighbor?"	Yes=1 No=10	9.03 (2.79)
	"Do you mind people of different religious beliefs as your neighbor?"	Yes=1 No=10	9.77 (1.42)
Trust of specific groups	"Do you trust people of different religious beliefs?"	Do not trust at all = 1 Somewhat distrust = 4 Somewhat trust = 7 Trust completely = 10	6.33 (1.94)
	"Do you trust people of different nationalities?"	Do not trust at all = 1 Somewhat distrust = 4 Somewhat trust = 7 Trust completely = 10	6.24 (1.96)
Weak national preoccupation	"I would fight for my country in a war."	Yes=1 No=10	4.55 (4.34)
	"I feel proud of my country."	Strongly agree=1 Agree=4 Disagree=7 Strongly Disagree=10	2.91 (2.38)

distribution, with a Kurtosis index value of 0.22 ($p < 0.001$) and skewness of -0.15.

Independent Variables

To test our hypothesis, we used the following independent variables. The first was the survey year, a categorical variable representing the three waves of the survey. We converted it to dummy items and used the first wave (WVS 5, surveyed in 2006) as a reference group. The second was the respondent's gender, where males were treated as the reference group (=0) and females as the value group (=1). The third focal predictor was race, where whites serve as the reference group and non-whites as the value group (racial minority = 1). Then the variable of income is a self-rated ordinal variable, ranging from 1-10. We recoded this variable into a dichotomous variable. The low- and mid-income groups (value 1-7) and high-income groups (value 8-10) are set as contrasting groups; alternative cut-offs have been tested for robustness¹.

We included the following control variables: age, education, subjective class, post-materialism, and

general social trust. The first was the respondent's age, measured in years from 18 to 99.² In modeling, age's squared term is also included to capture the possible non-linear effects of aging in one's life course. The second is education. We separated those with a university degree (educ = 1) from those with lower education (educ = 0). We also controlled for the effect of post-materialism, which was a value orientation that emphasizes self-expression and quality of life over economic and physical security (Inglehart, 1977). The measure was an index and calculated out of 12 items of preferences and value priorities. Finally, we controlled for the effect of global trust. The WVS survey asks respondents how much they trust most people in daily life. We recoded the item according to their response, which can either be "most people can be trusted" (=1), or "can't be too careful" (=0). All predictors and outcome variables' descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.

Modeling Strategy

To examine the research hypotheses, we fitted three OLS regression models. The first was a baseline

¹We tried different cut-off points, such as 1-6 vs 7-10, 1-7 vs 8-10 as a robustness check. Neither changes the main findings in the present study.

²We truncated age to the range of 18-99 to avoid the influence of outliers. For the very few cases who reported being younger than 18 or older than 99, we tried the following possibilities: (1) delete them; (2) round outliers up to 18 and round down to 99; (3) keep them as is. Different ways of handling this variable did not change the results in any noticeable ways.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Study (the USA, 2006-2017)

Variable	Statistics
<i>Year/Wave of Survey</i>	
2006 / WVS 5	1249 (20.55%)
2011 / WVS 6	2232 (36.73%)
2017 / WVS 7	2596 (42.72%)
<i>Gender (male=1)</i>	3099 (51.00%)
<i>Race (White as reference)</i>	
Non-White	1817 (29.90%)
<i>Class (Income 1st-7th Deciles as reference)</i>	
Upper Class (Top Income Groups, 8-10 Deciles)	546 (8.98%)
<i>Age</i>	
Age in years	46.36 (16.87)
<i>Education (less than university as reference)</i>	
University Degree	2074 (34.13%)
<i>Value Orientations</i>	
Postmaterialism Index (Range: 0 - 5)	2.11 (1.31)
General Trust Index (Range: 1-10)	4.52 (4.39)
<i>Dependent Variable</i>	
Cosmopolitanism Index (Range: 0-10)	6.86 (1.36)
Number of respondents	6077

Note: Frequency and Percentage for Categorical Variables; Mean and S.D. for Numeric Variables.

model with all variables, including the controls and the key predictors of survey years, gender, race, and social class. This model tested Hypothesis 1 on whether Americans' attitudes to cosmopolitanism differed by gender, race, and income over three survey waves. The second model tested Hypothesis 2 and included the interaction effects of survey year and gender. Model 3 included the interaction effects of survey years and income.³ Model 2-3 test whether the gaps in attitudes have widened in the period of interest (2006-2017) across genders and income. The modeling results are displayed in Table 3, and the main findings are visualized in Figure 1.

- Model 1: survey year + gender + race + class + individual-level control variables.
- Model 2: Model 1 + survey year * gender.
- Model 3: Model 1 + survey year * income.

We took the following steps to ensure robustness and increase our confidence in the findings. First, for

the variables with possible alternative coding methods, we tried using different thresholds or criteria of collapsing to ensure the various coding schema did not affect the main findings (see Footnotes 1 and 2). Second, for variables that might suffer from self-selection, such as education and social class, we used propensity score matching (PSM) with the nearest neighbor algorithm⁴. We then fitted regression models with both unmatched and matched samples to see if the findings were consistent. These steps did not raise any alerts and, as such, indicate the robustness of our results.

RESULTS

The frequency distributions of the variables in Table 2 suggest the sample is well-balanced and representative of the American population structure. Table 3 shows the results of OLS regression models predicting cosmopolitanism. The unstandardized coefficients are presented, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 is the baseline model with all

³The interactional model with survey year and race was omitted since its effect is not statistically significant.

⁴We used the "MatchIt" package (Stuart *et al.* 2011) in R programming language to conduct PSM. Details and reproducible codes are available upon request.

Table 3: OLS Regression Models Predicting Liberal Cosmopolitanism in the USA, 2006-2017 (Standard Errors in the Parenthesis)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	5.59 (0.11)***	5.69 (0.12)***	6.05 (0.22)***
Predictors			
<i>Survey Year (Ref: 2006)</i>			
2011	-0.18 (0.05)***	-0.29 (0.07)***	-0.48 (0.27)
2017	0.07 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.80 (0.27)**
Females (<i>Ref: Males</i>)	0.40 (0.03)***	0.20 (0.07)**	0.40 (0.03)***
Non-whites (<i>Ref: Whites</i>)	0.14 (0.04)***	0.14 (0.04)***	0.14 (0.04)***
Low/Mid Income Groups (<i>Ref: High-Income Groups</i>)	0.34 (0.10)**	0.34 (0.10)**	-0.13 (0.21)
Control Variables			
Age (in years)	-9.10 (1.29)***	-8.82 (1.29)***	-9.08 (1.29)***
Age Square	4.98 (1.26)***	5.02 (1.26)***	4.83 (1.26)***
University Degree	0.38 (0.04)***	0.39 (0.04)***	0.39 (0.04)***
<i>Value Orientations</i>			
Postmaterialism Index (1-6)	0.21 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***	0.21 (0.01)***
General Social Trust (0-1)	0.04 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***	0.04 (0.00)***
Interaction Terms of Survey Year and Key Predictors			
2011 * Females		0.20 (0.09)*	
2017 * Females		0.29 (0.09)***	
2011 * Non-Whites			
2017 * Non-Whites			
2011 * High Income Group			0.31 (0.28)
2017 * High Income Group			0.89 (0.27)***
Adj. R ²	0.13	0.13	0.13
N	6077	6077	6077

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.

variables' main effects. First, we notice that cosmopolitanism's overall support experienced a significant drop in 2011, while in 2006 and 2017, the support did not differ much. Findings on the main predictors are as expected: females (0.40, $p < 0.001$), non-Whites (0.14, $p < 0.001$), and mid- to lower-class individuals (0.34, $p < 0.01$) are more cosmopolitan than the males, Whites, and high-income groups. Both age's linear and quadratic terms are significant, indicating a non-linear curve existing in this variable's overall impact on cosmopolitanism; to be specific, Model 1's estimates on age show that one's cosmopolitan support would be the highest in the early twenties and the lowest during his/her sixties; after that, the predicted values would slightly increase. The

university-educated (0.38, $p < 0.001$) respondents show higher support for cosmopolitanism. Finally, post-material values and general social trust are all positively associated with cosmopolitan values. The findings on gender, race, and income levels all support Hypothesis 1 that disadvantaged status is associated with higher levels of cosmopolitan values.

Model 2 tests the second hypothesis, with interaction terms between gender and survey waves added to see if gender effects change over time. In the previous model, namely the Model 1, we have already seen that being a female is associated with a higher level of cosmopolitan support, by .40 ($p < 0.001$). Based on that, we further found in Model 2 that the

negative association between males and cosmopolitanism is enhanced in recent waves of the WVS; the interaction terms of gender and survey year 2011 and 2017 (WVS Wave 6 and 7) are .20 and .29 ($p < 0.001$), respectively. In other words, gender matters, and it matters even more in the latest survey year of 2017. Findings for other control variables largely remain the same as in Model 1.

Model 3 includes interaction terms between income levels and different survey years. As in Model 2, recent waves' interaction terms became more significant, and the magnitudes increased (from .31 to .89, $p < 0.001$). High-income groups support cosmopolitan values less than low-income groups, and the gap is significantly wider in the WVS wave 7 (2017). The interaction effect of survey year and race was dropped in the final analysis since its effect was insignificant. In other words, the racial gap in cosmopolitan values does not vary over the past decade; the difference between Whites and non-Whites remains largely stable.

To illustrate the divergence, we visualize the significant interaction effects from Model 2 and Model 3 in Figure 1. In Figure 1, we use Panel (a) on the left side to present the "survey year-gender" effect and the Panel (b) on the right side to show the "survey year-class" effect. For both plots, we place the survey years

on the X-axis and gender/class as the grouping variables. We use dashed red lines representing the disadvantaged groups (females/lower and mid-income groups) and solid blue lines for the privileged groups (males/high-income groups).

Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows that females are overall more cosmopolitan than males. In 2006, the gender gap was relatively narrow (0.2 points of difference on a 0-10 scale). In 2011, both male and female estimates dropped, and the one for males dropped further down; the gap between males and females widened to 0.35 points. In 2017, the discrepancy kept widening to 0.5 with the female values surpassing that in 2006 while the values of male cosmopolitanism recovered a bit but were lower than those in 2006. Panel (b) in Figure 1 tells a similar story: we observed a widening value gap between income groups as well. In 2006 and 2011, there were no significant differences in cosmopolitanism support between high- and low-income groups; in 2017, however, the discrepancy widened to more than 0.7 points with an increased cosmopolitan value among lower-income earners and continued sliding among higher-income earners. To sum up, the empirical evidence supports our research hypotheses. There were wider gaps in cosmopolitan attitudes between genders and income groups over the years: females and low-income people became more




Figure 1: Gender Gaps and Class Gaps in Cosmopolitanism in the USA, 2006-2017.

Fitted values are from Model 2 & Model 3 (Panel a & b respectively). All variables except for focal predictors are set to typical values (i.e., modal values for categorical variables and mean for numeric variables).

cosmopolitan. The interactional terms between race and survey years are not statistically significant, meaning the relationships remained unchanged over time.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

To better understand the sources of cosmopolitan sentiment and its change in the USA over a decade between 2006 and 2017, we rely on the measure of *liberal cosmopolitanism* created by Cao *et al.* (2024) to test the group status thesis. *Ceteris paribus* we have found that gender, race/ethnicity, and income significantly affected liberal cosmopolitanism, supporting the group status hypothesis (Gorman and Seguin 2018) that the marginalized and neglected groups within society tend to seek international attention to their dilemma and therefore, they are more cosmopolitan. Our findings that females and non-whites are significantly more pro-cosmopolitan than the more dominant counterparts contradict the argument that cosmopolitanism is more likely to be found among sophisticated and privileged individuals (Ossewaarde 2007; Wallerstein 1996). They are, however, consistent with the empirical findings of Gorman and Seguin (2018) who tested the hypothesis with data from other nations. The significance of race/ethnicity illustrated the prolonged centrality of the issue to the question of national in/exclusion (Cao and Wu, 2019). While illiberal nationalism is based on the exclusionary politics of *Othering*, those who technically belong to the nation can find themselves under suspicion as “others,” an experience too familiar to many racial/ethnic and religious minorities (Reisig *et al.* 2022). The effect of race is also consistent with the empirical findings of Furia’s study (2005) for different purposes. The stratification system pushes insecure and threatened groups, such as females and racial-ethnic minorities, to search for international allies. The results reflect the long-term negative experiences of women and ethnic/racial minorities in the US. The rise in awareness of their rights resulted in the growth of their demand for allies (Tsutsui 2018). Circumstantially, these results also fit the theoretical pattern predicted by the emancipatory theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013) that the traditionally oppressed groups have become increasingly more vocal. Our findings are robust because our measure of liberal cosmopolitanism is multi-dimensional and based on more than one point in time.

In addition, the stacked time-series data reveal a growing gap in liberal cosmopolitanism across genders

and income levels during the decade, consistent with the generally more polarized tendency of American politics during the same period. The interactional effects between years and gender and between years and income levels are significant. Female Americans had become more cosmopolitan over the years, while males were somewhat stagnant in embracing cosmopolitan values. Herek (2002) specifically finds females have higher tolerance of sexual minority rights, partly because they can empathize with other minority groups as they have been in a similar situation themselves. Similarly, the gaps across income levels grew in the recent waves of surveys, showing a trend of diverging opinions in the USA. The diversified line between high- and lower-income earners seems to have provided support for Wendt’s argument (1999) that those who benefit the most from globalization are also the ones who are least enthusiastic about the idea of cosmopolitanism.

Although we have found evidence supporting the group status thesis in gender, race, and income, we had mixed results for the effect of education. The effect of education in this study seemed to be inconsistent with the thesis: the better-educated elites are more cosmopolitan. The results are not entirely unexpected because they are consistent with the elite thesis proposed by Ossewaarde (2007) and Wallerstein (1996). The elite thesis argues that cosmopolitanism is more likely to be found among intellectually sophisticated individuals. The effect of education in this study is consistent with some of the findings in the literature (Gorman and Seguin 2020; Pichler 2009; 2011; Phillips and Smith 2008; Schueth and O’Loughlin 2008; Zhou 2016). Our data and analyses cannot settle the conflicting results, and future research could explore this issue with more targeted and comprehensive investigations.

Two other points are worth mentioning. First, the effect of age on cosmopolitanism is negative with older folks being less cosmopolitan, consistent with those existing studies (Bayram 2015; Phillips and Smith 2008; Pichler 2009; 2011; Schueth and O’Loughlin 2008; Zhou 2016) with slightly different dependent variables. Moreover, no studies have ever explored the curve linear relationship between age and cosmopolitanism. Our study has revealed a significant positive curve linear relationship between age and cosmopolitanism. One’s cosmopolitan values increased with age, and then at a certain point, they began to decline. Second, both post-materialism and global trust are significantly and positively associated with

cosmopolitan support. These are part of the larger liberal values, and our findings are consistent with the existing literature on the issues (Bayram 2015; Norris and Inglehart 2009; Schueth and O'Loughlin 2008). In conclusion, Americans' support for cosmopolitanism during the ten years between 2006-2017 under the investigation was reasonably strong and this sentiment is significantly related to the structural locations of people, such as gender and race.

This study has some limitations. First, cosmopolitanism is a contested term (McFarland *et al.* 2019; Roudometof 2005). Our measure is just one of many possibilities. Second, the repeated cross-sectional surveys provide insights into the tentative causal mechanisms between race and gender on liberal cosmopolitanism. Firmly establishing the causal link depends on longitudinal data. Third, the last survey data were collected in 2017 while the unexpected Covid-19 pandemic swept the world in 2020. With the rise of vaccine nationalism regarding the distribution of vaccines, the contention has triggered the deeply seated culture of isolationism that is hostile to international organizations (e.g., the WTO and UN) and to cosmopolitanism, posing a new challenge to the further growth of cosmopolitanism in the United States. Similarly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2023 might beef up ethnic nationalism. Last but not least, Trump is running to become president of the USA again in 2024 with his "Make America Great Again" agenda. It seems that most Republicans have been energized by cultural conservatism, which includes support for pro-life, concerns about discrimination against Whites, and negative feelings toward Muslims, gays and lesbians, atheists, and immigrants among others (Cullen *et al.* 2022; Graham *et al.* 2021). A fuller impact of these sociopolitical events on cosmopolitan moods may only be revealed in the next few rounds of data collection.

In sum, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the idea of cosmopolitanism was popular in the USA. However, former President Trump declared in his address to the UN assembly that "The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots" (*The Guardian* 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian-Ukraine War, and Israel's war in Gaza all seem to have interrupted the slow move towards an enhanced interconnected global order. With seemingly shrinking opportunities for upward mobility, the hope of the marginalized groups appears dim and could result in a breeding ground for the growth of far-right ideology and self-isolationism which constantly use every

opportunity to spread their enduring hatred and hostility toward poor immigrants. Both the domestic and international troubles constantly remind us that, like the ideals of an inclusive and supportive society (Cao *et al.* 2024; Cullen 1994; Nussbaum and Cohen 2002; Young 2011), cosmopolitanism is a complex, humanistic, noble political project, and as such, it is likely to remain an unrealized ideal for a long time to come.

DATA AVAILABILITY

Data are available in a repository and can be accessed via their DOI link: doi:10.14281/18241.17

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